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Dense Women 
ALENA ALLEN* 
Pink ribbons have become a fixture in our society. Breast cancer 
advocates have mobilized to bring breast cancer awareness to heights 
that would have been unimaginable a generation ago. Women are 
indoctrinated with the familiar mantra that early detection is the best 
protection against breast cancer. As a result, cadres of women were 
dismayed when diagnosed with advanced stage breast cancer despite 
having had their yearly prescribed mammogram. Along with their 
diagnosis, they were also told for the first time that they had dense 
breast tissue, which can obscure cancer on mammography film. 
Outraged and disgusted that their physicians did not disclose their 
breast density sooner, these dense women turned to legislators for 
help. Their stories are compelling. Their remedy seems obvious. If 
doctors are not telling their patients that they have dense breast tissue, 
then the law should force them to do so. Legislators across the country 
have listened and many have been convinced of the merits. After all, 
why would a legislator not support legislation that seeks to empower 
women and give them information to make informed choices about 
their healthcare? In 2009, Connecticut became the first state to enact 
dense breast notification legislation and since then an additional 
twenty-two states have followed suit. Currently, seven state 
legislatures and the U.S. Congress are considering breast density 
notification bills. 
 
This Article presents the case against breast density notification 
statutes and argues that such statutes are actually injurious to women. 
Part II provides context by providing background about breast cancer 
and how it is diagnosed. Part III explores the ideal of patient 
autonomy and analyzes whether the enacted dense breast tissue 
notification statutes empower or undermine women. Part IV examines 
how these statutes affect patient care and calls into question the 
wisdom of having legislators dictating the standard of care along with 
the content of physician-patient communications. Part V offers a path 
forward by calling on states and the federal government to inform 
women broadly through public health initiatives instead of utilizing 
standardized breast density notifications. It also offers suggestions for 
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legislators who prefer a statutory remedy. Finally, Part VI offers a 
brief conclusion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Like the scarlet letter “A,” breast cancer used to be a blot on the 
escutcheon for American women.1 Women who were diagnosed with breast 
cancer did not discuss their diagnosis privately or publicly.2 Forty years ago, 
vast support networks did not exist. Millions did not Race for the Cure.3 Pink 
ribbons were worn at the end of pig-tails of little girls and not on the lapels of 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Barbara F. Sharf, Out of the Closet and into the Legislature: Breast Cancer 
Stories, 20 HEALTH AFF. 213, 213 (2001) (discussing that prior to the 1990s women “did 
not disclose their personal stories of breast cancer to one another privately, let alone 
publicly”). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Holly Yan, Tens of Thousands Expected at Race for the Cure—The Event, in Its 
22nd Year, Raises Money to Fight Breast Cancer, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 15, 2004, at 
1B (noting that Dallas hosted the first Race for the Cure in 1983 with 800 people 
participating); see also Paul Walsh, Olympic Champ Set to Walk in Race for the Cure, 
STAR TRIB. (May 7, 2011), http://m.startribune.com/lifestyle/health/121383414.html 
[http://perma.cc/2H4Y-HZP8] (“The Komen Race for the Cure has grown to more than 100 
races worldwide, with more than 1 million participating in 2010.”). 
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adults.4 October was mostly associated with crisp cool air and football,5 and 
the notion of NFL football players tackling each other while wearing pink 
cleats to raise awareness for breast cancer would have been absurd.6 Needless 
to say, there has been a profound shift in the amount of societal support for 
women diagnosed with breast cancer. 
Prior to the 1970s, women who were diagnosed with breast cancer had 
very few options. They were routinely treated with a “one-step” mutilative 
procedure known as a radical mastectomy.7 Physicians, who at that time were 
mostly male,8 were quick to remove a woman’s breast upon diagnosis of 
cancer because many viewed the breast as a “nonvital and functionless 
gland.”9 Some physicians believed that women were prone to hysteria, overly 
emotional, and incapable of making rational decisions.10 As a consequence, 
                                                                                                                     
 4 See GAYLE A. SULIK, PINK RIBBON BLUES: HOW BREAST CANCER CULTURE 
UNDERMINES WOMEN’S HEALTH 47 (2010) (noting that the pink ribbon was introduced as 
the official symbol for breast cancer awareness in 1992). 
 5 See, e.g., Leah Nurik, I Survived Breast Cancer, but I Hate Breast Cancer 
Awareness Month, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
posteverything/wp/2014/10/10/i-survived-breast-cancer-but-i-hate-Breast-cancer-awareness-
month/ [http://perma.cc/Q8LT-US4R] (explaining that her love of October has been faded 
because of the “pervasiveness of pink ribbons”). 
 6 Currently, the NFL is known for dousing players in pink during the month of 
October to shore up its female fan base. See Lindsay H. Jones, NFL Pushes on with Pink 
Campaign, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/ 
2014/09/30/nfl-breast-cancer-awareness/16508773/ [http://perma.cc/9V4B-V9NU] (noting 
that the “NFL’s annual breast cancer awareness campaign, always in October, has long 
been the league’s most substantial plan to appeal to women”); see also Jamal Thalji, Breast 
Cancer Awareness Month Is Promoted by the NFL in October, but Domestic Violence 
Awareness Month is Not, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/ 
news/business/after-domestic-violence-gaffes-is-nfl-the-best-ambassador-for-breast/2201581 
[http://perma.cc/SHB7-DHNM] (“In October, the National Football League turns pink. 
Players wear pink gloves and pink cleats, honoring the pink ribbon that symbolizes Breast 
Cancer Awareness Month.”). 
 7 See BARRON H. LERNER, THE BREAST CANCER WARS: HOPE, FEAR, AND THE 
PURSUIT OF A CURE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 17–29 (2001) (providing a thorough 
history of the treatment of breast cancer in the United States). Lerner describes the radical 
mastectomy as an operation which leaves “women with a deformed chest wall, hollow 
areas beneath the clavicle and the underarm, and, at times, persistent pain at the operative 
site and arm swelling known as lymphedema.” Id. at 32–33. 
 8 In the 1970s women physicians were in short supply. According to census data less 
than 10% of physicians were women. Today, a little more than 30% of physicians are 
women. For a discussion of the percentage of women in professional fields over time see 
Josh Mitchell, Women Notch Progress, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 4, 2012), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323717004578159433220839020 [http://perma.cc/ 
PX85-93M8], noting that in 1970 women were 9.7% of doctors and in 2010 the percentage 
increased to 32.4%. 
 9  See LERNER, supra note 7, at 89. 
 10 See, e.g., Eloise C. Haun, The Unconscious Breast, 109 VA. MED. 750, 753 (1982) 
(“No matter how informed the patient is regarding treatment modalities for . . . ‘breast 
cancer’ and its metastases, the choice of treatment can be colored by effect. . . . If a 
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physicians believed that they were the best decision-makers for their women 
patients and their “functionless” body parts.11 
Scant attention was given to the fact that, for many women, the breast in 
and of itself is the essence of femininity symbolizing motherhood, 
womanhood, and sexuality.12 Perhaps partly because the breast is so closely 
associated with femininity,13 women fear breast cancer and the loss of their 
breasts.14 Even when women chose a radical mastectomy fully appreciating 
and understanding available options, women still suffered both physical and 
psychological consequences.15 Women afflicted with breast cancer viewed 
themselves as victims of a brutal disease, and worse still, they viewed 
themselves as victims of paternalistic physicians.16 They often suffered from 
depression, anxiety, and fear in silence.17 
Finally, during the 1970s, collective silence yielded to audible accounts of 
surviving breast cancer. For the first time, women began to speak publicly 
about their battle with breast cancer. These women showed incredible 
vulnerability by sharing their stories, and their act of bravery inspired legions 
                                                                                                                     
woman’s marriage partner or lover is strongly attached to the breast, research into medical 
literature will be focused on ways to preserve the breast so as to save the relationship.”); 
George E. Murphy, The Clinical Management of Hysteria, 247 JAMA 2559, 2559 (1982) 
(finding that hysteria is limited almost exclusively to women). 
 11 See BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, COMPLAINTS AND DISORDERS: 
THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF SICKNESS 26–27 (1st ed. 1973) (noting that medical professionals 
viewed middle class women as frail and capable of only the lightest preoccupations). 
 12 See Leslie Bennetts, Relationships; Breast Cancer and Sexuality, N.Y. TIMES  
(Mar. 1, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/01/style/relationships-breast-cancer-and-
sexuality.html [http://perma.cc/2DL2-TUEL] (quoting Regina Kriss: “Your breasts are a 
symbol of your femininity, your desirability, your ability to entice. This is a very breast-
oriented society, and it’s like everything you can offer a man is gone. It isn’t a vanity 
problem. It’s an essential part of your core existence as a woman.”). 
 13 See Lena Williams, Women Who Lose Breasts Define Their Own Femininity, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 25, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/25/health/women-who-lose-
breasts-define-their-own-femininity.html [http://perma.cc/D8KH-2D5U] (quoting Ann 
Marcou: “People used to hide in the closet. Individual women still tussle with their body 
because it’s so valued in society. Every woman who goes through this will wonder about 
her femininity and sexuality.”). 
 14 See Dina Roth Port, Stopping Breast Cancer, 65 PREVENTION 95, 95 (2013) (“Long 
before we get our first pimple, budding breasts remind us that we’re women in training. We 
love them, we hate them. We want them to grow bigger, we wish they’d stop growing . . . . 
No matter how conflicted we may be, breasts are part of our female identity, which may be 
why, for most of us, having breast cancer is our biggest fear.”). 
 15 See, e.g., Beth E. Meyerowitz, Psychosocial Correlates of Breast Cancer and Its 
Treatments, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 108, 112–13 (1980) (finding that the physical disruption 
of the radical mastectomy was substantial, making it difficult to sleep, have sexual 
intimacy, and adapt to clothing and body image problems; also finding that return to usual 
physical and social activities was also reportedly diminished in many women). 
 16 See Aurora P. Mamaril, Preventing Complications After Radical Mastectomy, 74 
AM. J. NURSING 2000, 2003 (1974). 
 17 Id. 
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of women. Their stories increased public awareness and became the catalyst 
for improving care.18 Sharing stories began to foster a community and 
provided succor to women coping with breast cancer. Notably, Rose Kushner, 
a journalist, wrote about her quest to find a doctor willing to perform breast 
conserving surgery rather than the then standard radical mastectomy.19 Audre 
Lorde wrote a compelling account about her cancer diagnosis, its 
repercussions, her breast cancer journey, the search for alternative treatments, 
and her decision not to “pass” by wearing a prosthetic.20 By publicizing their 
journey, women were no longer silent victims but instead evolved into vocal 
and proud survivors21 and “thrivers.”22 
Today public support and awareness of breast cancer is unparalleled.23 
The culture of silence has been replaced with at times the deafening roar of 
                                                                                                                     
 18 When Betty Ford, then the first lady, in 1974 disclosed that she had undergone a 
mastectomy she opened the door for many women to speak publicly about breast cancer. 
See Natasha Singer, Welcome, Fans, to the Pinking of America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/business/in-the-breast-cancer-fight-the-pinking-
of-america.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/TW9Z-KCXQ] (discussing that after Betty Ford 
went public about her breast cancer, the number of women having mammograms sky-
rocketed); see also infra pp. 855–56 (discussing informed consent legislation). 
 19 Kushner was a pioneering advocate for breast cancer patients. She argued for the 
need for individualized patient-centered decision-making with respect to breast cancer 
treatment. Kushner published three books on the topic. See ROSE KUSHNER, BREAST 
CANCER: A PERSONAL HISTORY AND AN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 185–205 (1975); ROSE 
KUSHNER, WHY ME?: WHAT EVERY WOMAN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT BREAST CANCER TO 
SAVE HER LIFE 174–93 (First Signet Printing 1977) (1975); ROSE KUSHNER, 
ALTERNATIVES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAR ON BREAST CANCER 218–37 (First 
Warner Books 1985) (1984). 
 20 See generally AUDRE LORDE, THE CANCER JOURNALS (1980). 
 21 Deena Metzger famously embraced surviving breast cancer by being photographed 
by Halla Hammid in a much-publicized photograph, “Tree.” In the photograph, Metzer is 
topless and fearlessly displaying her one-breasted torso with a tree tattoo covering the scar 
from her mastectomy. The photograph was accompanied by this statement by Metzger:  
There is a fine red line across my chest where a knife entered, but now a branch winds 
about the scar and travels from arm to heart. . . . I have relinquished some of the scars. 
I have designed my chest with the care given to an illuminated manuscript. I am no 
longer ashamed to make love. . . . Love is a battle I can win. I have the body of a 
warrior who does not kill or wound. On the book of my body, I have permanently 
inscribed a tree. 
DEENA METZGER, TREE: ESSAYS & PIECES 91 (1997); see also I Am No Longer Afraid 
Poster, Donnelly/Colt Catalog (Wingbow Press 1989), reprinted in LERNER, supra note 7, 
at 270. See generally BETTY ROLLIN, FIRST, YOU CRY (1976) (penning a poignant account 
of her bout with breast cancer). 
 22 Some breast cancer survivors prefer the term “thriver.” For example, see generally 
BEVERLY VOTE, HOW WE BECAME BREAST CANCER THRIVERS (2010), for a collection of 
stories from women about how their faith helped them thrive in spite of their diagnosis. 
 23 See Peggy Orenstein, Our Feel-Good War on Breast Cancer, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/magazine/our-feel-good-war-on-
breast-cancer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/FKP8-53TN] (noting that Susan 
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advocates. Pink ribbons,24 an international symbol of breast cancer, are 
commonly worn by both women and men throughout the year.25 For the 
afflicted, the pink ribbon has become an emblem of courage in the face of a 
ruthless disease, and for family and friends of the afflicted, the pink ribbon is a 
tangible and steadfast image of solidarity.26 In October, the official breast 
cancer awareness month, pink ribbons become ubiquitous. Although the U.S. 
has 175 officially designated “national health observances” ranging from 
National Radon Action Month to Food Allergy Month,27 no other observance 
comes close to prominence of breast cancer awareness month.28 In October, 
the messaging of breast cancer advocates seems to reach a frenetic pitch.29 By 
                                                                                                                     
G. Komen is the largest breast-cancer organization and “[w]ith its dozens of races ‘for the 
cure’ and some 200 corporate partnerships, it may be the most successful charity ever at 
branding a disease; its relentless marketing has made the pink ribbon one of the most 
recognized logos of our time”). 
 24 Evelyn Lauder, an executive at cosmetic behemoth Estee Lauder, worked with 
Alexandra Penney to create the pink ribbon campaign for breast cancer awareness. In the 
beginning, Mrs. Lauder and her husband paid for little bows to be given to women at 
department store makeup counters to remind them about breast exams. See Associated 
Press, Lauder, Maker of Breast Cancer’s Pink Ribbon, Dies, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 18, 
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204224604577035092160570480 
[http://perma.cc/7RF7-C8FQ]. 
 25 See, e.g., Terri Lynne Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 883, 915 (2010) (noting that a pink ribbon is the commonly worn universal 
symbol for breast cancer awareness). 
 26 Some states have even designated a special time each year to celebrate women who 
have been diagnosed by wearing pink. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 1:58.5(B) (Supp. 2015) 
(providing that “[i]n honor of those who have been diagnosed with breast cancer, October 
twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh are hereby designated annually as ‘Care 
Enough to Wear Pink’ days through the state of Louisiana”); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 36:2-86 (West Supp. 2015) (designating the month of October as “Breast Cancer 
Awareness Month” in the state of New Jersey). 
 27 See 2015 National Health Observances, HEALTHFINDER.GOV, 
http://healthfinder.gov/NHO/nho.aspx?year=2015 [http://perma.cc/2L8B-8G8V]. 
 28 October is also Home Eye Safety Month, National Down Syndrome Awareness 
Month, and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) Awareness Month, but there are no 
marketing tie-ins with these causes. See id. In contrast, the marketing tie-ins with breast 
cancer are substantial. See, e.g., Tara Parker-Pope, How to Tell if a Pink-Ribbon Product 
Really Helps Breast-Cancer Efforts, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB116043734736287479 [http://perma.cc/2C54-Z6U8] (“Store shelves are filling 
up with pink products tied to October’s Breast Cancer Awareness month . . . . There is a 
seemingly endless variety of pink products on offer these days. The options range 
from . . . pink M&Ms and Tic Tacs . . . to home appliances such as a pink KitchenAid 
mixer or pink Dyson vacuum cleaner.”). 
 29 See, e.g., Jean Hopfensperger, Pink Blitz for Breast Cancer Stirs Debate, 
STARTRIB. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.startribune.com/pink-blitz-for-breast-cancer-stirs-
debate/131926483/ [http://perma.cc/DF3W-MK9U] (noting that in October “options are 
everywhere. Sit down at a restaurant and get offered a ‘pink drink.’ Head to the coffee shop 
and get handed a cup wrapped in a pink band. Click on the TV and check out NFL players 
in pink shoes and arm bands. Visit a high school baseball game and find a fan wearing the 
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linking brands and products to breast cancer awareness, breast cancer charities 
have been able to ramp up awareness and inundate shelves with pink.30 Their 
strategy has been so successful in marketing that “pink” is now a verb.31 
Breast cancer advocates have successfully harnessed personal stories,32 
organization,33 and money34 to promote awareness. Promotion activities have 
reached the judiciary spawning case law on First Amendment rights.35 In 
addition, advocates have taken their message to both state and federal 
legislators. For example, advocates were instrumental in the passage of 
                                                                                                                     
T-shirt ‘Don’t Let Cancer Steal Second Base.’”); see also Singer, supra note 18 (“The 
entire Cowboys stadium [is pink]. Pink is everywhere: around the goalposts, in the crowd, 
on the players’ cleats, towels and wristbands.”). 
 30 See Amy McFadden, Think Pink and Buy Pink for Breast Cancer Research,  
ST. J. REG. (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.sj-r.com/article/20081012/NEWS/310129961/0/ 
SEARCH [http://perma.cc/EC49-T3ST] (“Beyond the ubiquitous pink ties connected to the 
‘Real Men Wear Pink’ campaign, and pink lingerie and sleepwear for women, items range 
from T-shirts to socks, to pots and pans, to ink pens and office supplies, to household 
appliances.”). 
 31 See Singer, supra note 18 (“In marketing circles, ‘to pink’ means to link a brand or 
a product or even the entire National Football League to one of the most successful charity 
campaigns of all time.”). 
 32 For example, Senator Tom Harkin touts his support for government-funded 
preventative care like mammograms as stemming from personal experience. See Jane C. 
Timm, Emotional Tom Harkin Shares how Preventive Women’s Health Services Could 
Have Saved His Sisters’ Lives, MSNBC (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.msnbc.com/ 
msnbc/emotional-tom-harkin-shares-how-preventi [http://perma.cc/S7ZE-QD22] (quoting 
Senator Harkin describing his sisters’ experience with breast cancer: “They didn’t have any 
money. They didn’t really have health care coverage. When my older sister Marianne died 
and we went to her funeral, her younger sister Silvia was there and had no idea that she 
also had breast cancer. Within two years, she was dead also. And they left young 
families.”). 
 33 See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy over High-Dose 
Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH 
AFF. 101, 106 (2001) (“[T]he degree of political organization and mobilization among 
breast cancer patients and their advocates is high. Approximately 400 support . . . groups 
are organized under the aegis of the National Alliance of Breast Cancer Organizations 
(NABCO), which engages in large-scale educational and lobbying activities.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Michele Munz, After Support Drops for Komen, New Director Visits 
St. Louis to Bring Focus to Mission, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/health/after-support-drops-for-komen-new-
director-visits-st-louis/article_4661ef89-1b40-57bf-b32e-fb511935af58.html [http://perma.cc/ 
ADS8-JMHD] (noting that Susan G. Komen, the largest charity devoted to breast cancer, 
has invested “more than $800 million in breast cancer research and $1.6 billion in 
screening, education and treatment programs in more than 30 countries since its 
inception”). 
 35 Students have challenged bans implemented by school districts which prohibit 
wearing “I heart boobies!” bracelets as part of a nationally recognized breast cancer 
awareness campaign. See, e.g., B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 
301 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc); J.A. v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., No. 1:12-CV-155 JVB, 
2013 WL 4479229, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2013). 
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mammography standards.36 Advocates also successfully lobbied for legislation 
mandating that insurers provide coverage for breast reconstruction following 
mastectomies37 and also fought for quicker access to drugs.38 
During the 1980s, breast cancer survivors advocated for breast cancer 
informed consent laws in state legislatures across the country.39 These women 
believed that they had a fundamental right to be made aware of treatment 
alternatives and to be given choices.40 They shared their stories of consenting 
to a biopsy only to wake up to find that they had received a radical 
mastectomy.41 Advocates argued that even though studies consistently showed 
that less invasive surgery (lumpectomy with radiation, known as breast-
conserving surgery, or “BCS”) yielded outcomes equivalent to those of the 
radical mastectomy and that the use of radical mastectomies remained 
alarmingly high.42 
Based on their lobbying efforts, twenty-two states passed breast cancer 
informed consent laws.43 The informed consent laws yielded tepid results. 
                                                                                                                     
 36 See Mammography Quality Standards Act (MQSA) of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263b 
(2012); see also Florence Houn et al., The Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992: 
History and Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 485, 487 (1995) (“In response to growing 
public awareness and concern about the devastating effects of breast cancer, Congress 
passed MQSA on October 27, 1992 to ensure national quality standards for mammography 
services.”). 
 37 Congress passed the Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998 in response to 
public pressure from breast cancer advocates. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185b (2012) (mandating 
that if a group health plan provides coverage for a mastectomy then it shall also provide 
benefits for breast reconstruction). 
 38 When insurers denied payment for expensive high-dose chemotherapy-autologous 
bone marrow transplants, which was used to treat women with advanced breast cancer, 
breast cancer survivors advocated state legislators and some states passed laws mandating 
coverage. Although the laws were repealed when controlled studies showed that the 
treatment was not effective. See e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-c (2006) (repealed 
2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (2007) (repealed 2008). 
 39 See Theresa Montini, Resist and Redirect: Physicians Respond to Breast Cancer 
Informed Consent Legislation, 26 WOMEN & HEALTH 85, 86 (1997).  
 40 Id. at 91. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Nancy N. Baxter et al., Trends in the Treatment of Ductal Carcinoma In Situ of 
the Breast, 96 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 443, 443 (2004) (finding that “many patients were 
found to undergo aggressive surgical therapy, including mastectomy and axillary 
dissection”); Ann B. Nattinger et al., Minimal Increase in Use of Breast-Conserving 
Surgery from 1986 to 1990, 34 MED. CARE 479, 479 (1996) (“Despite the substantial 
evidence supporting BCS as an alternative to mastectomy, the overall use of BCS in 
Medicare inpatients increased minimally from 1986 to 1990.”). 
 43 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 109277 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 458.324, 459.0125 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-21 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 671-3 (West Supp. 2014); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2310/2310-345 (West 2015); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2836(m) (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.935 (LexisNexis 
2011); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1300.151–.154 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905-
A (2015); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-113 (LexisNexis 2009); MD. CODE ANN., 
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Researchers found that the state laws mandating the disclosure of alternatives 
for the treatment of breast cancer were temporarily associated with a slight 
increase in the use of breast-conserving surgery.44 The increases were short 
lived, however, ranging from three to twelve months after which the use of 
breast-conserving surgery reverted to previous levels.45 
Most recently, breast cancer advocates have lobbied for dense breast tissue 
notification legislation. Dense breast tissue notification legislation was 
pioneered by Nancy Cappello of Woodbury, Connecticut.46 Mrs. Cappello had 
regular mammograms for over ten years before her doctor found a suspicious 
ridge during a manual exam.47 When her doctor found the ridge, Cappello was 
immediately referred for a mammogram and ultrasound on the same day.48 
The mammogram once again failed to detect the tumor, but the ultrasound 
found a tumor the size of a quarter. When Cappello inquired as to why the 
mammogram was unable to detect her tumor, her doctor for the first time 
mentioned that she had dense breasts, which can hinder the ability of a 
radiologist to detect cancer on mammographic film.49 After undergoing a 
mastectomy, chemotherapy, radiation and hormone treatment, Capello began 
to advocate for legislation requiring radiologists or mammographic facilities to 
inform women when they have dense breasts.50 
Cappello was outraged at the thought of women having yearly 
mammograms without knowing that their dense breast tissue could obscure 
                                                                                                                     
HEALTH OCC. § 14-404 (LexisNexis 2014); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70E (LexisNexis 
2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17013–.17513 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.651(9) (West Supp. 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1250 (West 2013); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 37-3-333 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2-168 (West 2007); id. § 45:9-22.3a, 3b 
(West 2004); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2404–2409 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2015); 35 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5641–5642 (West 2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. §§ 86.001–.005, .011, .012 (West 2010) (repealed 2013); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 54.1-2971 (2005) (repealed 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-33-1 to -12 (LexisNexis 
2011). 
 44 See Ann Butler Nattinger, The Effect of Legislative Requirements on the Use of 
Breast-Conserving Surgery, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1035, 1039 (1996) (finding that states 
with directive disclosure laws saw an increase in breast conserving surgery ranging from 
6–13%). 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Denise Grady, New Laws Add a Divisive Component to Breast Screening, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/health/laws-tell-mammogram-
clinics-to-address-breast-density.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/6Y66-XNUZ]. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Melinda Beck, The Latest Mammogram Controversy: Density, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044424690457757318146 
3638846 [http://perma.cc/FYR7-3NHG].  
 49 Id. 
 50 Capello is the founder of Are You Dense Advocacy Inc., which advocates for 
legislative and regulatory efforts to standardize the communication of dense breast tissue to 
women. See About Us, ARE YOU DENSE? ADVOCACY, http://areyoudense 
advocacy.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/P3LF-HU2Q] [hereinafter ARE YOU DENSE?]. 
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cancerous tumors.51 Thus, she tirelessly lobbied Connecticut legislators and in 
2009, Connecticut became the first state to mandate standardized 
communication of dense breast tissue in mammography reports given to 
patients.52 The required notification states: 
If your mammogram demonstrates that you have dense breast tissue, which 
could hide small abnormalities, you might benefit from supplementary 
screening tests, which can include a breast ultrasound screening or a breast 
MRI examination, or both, depending on your individual risk factors. A 
report of your mammography results, which contains information about your 
breast density, has been sent to your physician’s office and you should 
contact your physician if you have any questions or concerns about this 
report.53 
In addition, Connecticut also mandates that insurers cover the cost of 
expensive ultrasound scans for women who have dense breast tissue.54 
Cappello was buoyed by her success with Connecticut legislators and launched 
a national advocacy organization, “Are You Dense Advocacy.”55 The stated 
goal of her organization is to “[a]dvocate for and support state and federal 
legislative and regulatory efforts to standardize the communication of dense 
breast tissue to women.”56 Cappello’s success in Connecticut has inspired 
women across the country to advocate for similar legislation in their states. 
Texas became the second state to enact density notification legislation. 
Texas legislators passed a notification bill, also known as Henda’s law, in 
2011.57 Henda Salmeron, like Cappello, had regular mammograms which 
failed to detect cancer.58 Salmeron detected a lump in her breast and went back 
for another mammogram which again failed to detect the tumor.59 However, 
this time she was referred for an ultrasound which did detect the tumor.60 
                                                                                                                     
 51 See Grady, supra note 46. 
 52 Id. 
 53 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503(c) (West 2012). 
 54 See id. § 38a-503(a)(2). Connecticut is one of only two states that mandates 
notification of breast density and mandates that insurers cover supplemental screenings. 
 55 See David Katz, Being Less Dense About Breast Cancer Screenings, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-katz-md/breast-cancer-screening 
_b_3922681.html [http://perma.cc/LS73-2L4H] (noting that Are You Dense Advocacy 
began in 2011 as a result of a “flurry of interest” in breast density legislation). 
 56 See ARE YOU DENSE?, supra note 50. 
 57 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 86.013(a) (West Supp. 2014). 
 58 Bradford Pearson, Henda’s Law, D MAG. (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2011/november/how-hendas-law-
was-born [http://perma.cc/4UFZ-GGEA] (reporting that after Salmeron lost the weight, she 
noticed a lump, about the size of a pea near her right breastbone: “Mammograms at age 35, 
40, 41, and 42 were normal, but Salmeron couldn’t let it go.”). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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Salmeron was diagnosed with an advanced form of breast cancer.61 While 
undergoing radiation treatments, Salmeron began advocating for dense breast 
tissue notification legislation in Texas.62 Salmeron worked with legislators to 
draft a bill, and her efforts came to fruition when Henda’s law was passed in 
2011.63 
In 2012, three more states California,64 Virginia,65 and New York66 passed 
similar density notification statutes. California’s bill was inspired by Amy 
Colton, a nurse whose breast cancer went undetected despite years of regular 
screening mammograms.67 Similarly, Cathryn Tatusko, a nurse who was 
diagnosed with late-stage breast cancer after fourteen years of “normal” 
mammograms, tirelessly lobbied legislators in Virginia.68 New York’s statute 
was passed thanks in part to the lobbying efforts of another dense woman, 
JoAnn Pushkin. Like the others, Pushkin was diagnosed with advanced cancer 
despite having had regular mammograms.69 
Their stories are powerful. The density notification advocates present 
compelling narratives to legislators. Each took ownership of their health by 
living healthy and active lifestyles. Each believed that having regular 
mammograms would ensure early detection of breast cancer. Yet, each was 
betrayed by their faith in mammograms, which allowed them to go years 
without realizing that cancer was growing in their breasts. United by anger, 
they have lobbied legislators to mandate that dense women be informed that 
cancer may be obscured on mammography film. 
Their message is hard to resist. They are advocating to inform and 
empower women. They want to standardize, improve, and promote increased 
doctor-patient communication. Their message is so enticing that state 
legislators across the country are listening. Inspired by their indignation and a 
                                                                                                                     
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123222.3(a) (West Supp. 2015). 
 65 VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-229 (2011). 
 66 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2404-c (McKinney Supp. 2015). 
 67 See Steven Harmon, Is It a Woman’s Right to Know She Has a Condition That 
Could Mask Breast Cancer?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_18837571 [http://perma.cc/QQ5B-MN2S] (reporting that 
Colton religiously had a mammogram every year since turning forty). 
 68 See Laura Vozzella, Breast-Density Bill to Become Law in Virginia,  
WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/virginia-to-
require-radiologists-to-notify-mammogram-patients-of-breast-density/2012/02/09/gIQArdFpBR 
_story.html [http://perma.cc/W9NY-E8HD] (reporting that Tatusko had mammograms for 
fourteen straight years that showed no signs of cancer). 
 69 See Liz Szabo, Study: Dense Breast Tissue Doesn’t Add Cancer Death Risk, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 21, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/story/2012-08-20/ 
breast-density-death/57171282/1 [http://perma.cc/FG9Z-VZX5] (noting that Pushkin’s 
annual mammogram missed her breast cancer). 
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sense of duty to women, lawmakers have taken action. In 2013, Alabama,70 
Hawaii,71 Maryland,72 Nevada,73 North Carolina,74 Oregon,75 Pennsylvania,76 
and Tennessee77 enacted density notification laws. Arizona,78 Massachusetts,79 
Minnesota,80 Missouri,81 New Jersey,82 Ohio,83 and Rhode Island84 passed 
density notification statutes in 2014. In 2015, Delaware,85 Michigan,86 and 
North Dakota87 have enacted density notification laws. Currently, twenty-three 
states have enacted dense breast tissue notification laws. Many states currently 
have bills pending in their legislatures88 and a federal bill has been introduced 
in the House89 and Senate.90 
While the stories of Cappello and others whose cancer was obscured by 
dense breast tissue are compelling, personal narratives are not necessarily the 
best basis for driving public policy. Such stories are anecdotes and provide 
little in the way of determining the magnitude, scope, and source of the 
problem. Such narratives always militate in favor of action, without fully 
appreciating the downside consequences. From a legislative prospective, there 
is no need to rigorously examine the evidence because delaying action risks 
the lives of unsuspecting dense women. This is especially true when the 
requested action seems relatively easy to implement. 
This Article presents the first critical analysis of the various types of 
density notification statutes. Part II provides context by providing background 
about breast cancer and how it is diagnosed. Part III explores the ideal of 
patient autonomy and analyzes whether dense breast tissue notification statutes 
empower or undermine women. Part IV examines how these statutes effect 
                                                                                                                     
 70 ALA. CODE § 22-13-71(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
 71 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321-46(a) (West Supp. 2014). 
 72 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-115(c)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
 73 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457.1857(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 74 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-215.5(a) (2013). 
 75 OR. REV. STAT. § 431.823 (2013). 
 76 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10229.2(b) (West Supp. 2015). 
 77 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-245(b) (Supp. 2014). 
 78 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-415(A) (Supp. 2014). 
 79 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111 § 5Q(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 80 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.1212(2) (West Supp. 2015). 
 81 MO. ANN. STAT. § 192.769(1) (West Supp. 2015). 
 82 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2-184.3 (West Supp. 2015). 
 83 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3702.40(B) (West Supp. 2015). 
 84 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-12.9-2 (Supp. 2014). 
 85 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3201A (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch. 193). 
 86 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.13524(1) (West Supp. 2015). 
 87 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-43 (Supp. 2015). 
 88 See, e.g., H.F. 171, 86th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2015); S.B. 5040, 64th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015). 
 89 Breast Density and Mammography Reporting Act of 2015, H.R. 716, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
 90 Breast Density and Mammography Reporting Act of 2015, S. 370, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
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patient care and calls into question the wisdom of having legislators dictating 
the standard of care and the content of physician-patient communications. Part 
V offers a path forward by calling on states and the federal government to 
inform women broadly through public health initiatives instead of mandating 
standardized density notification disclosures. In addition, Part V also offers 
suggestions for legislators who, nonetheless, wish to implement mandatory 
dense breast tissue notification legislation. Finally, Part VI offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. THE ANATOMY OF BREAST CANCER 
Breast cancer advocates have successfully promoted awareness since the 
1970s. As Judge Tinder has eloquently stated, “[h]ardly a person among us has 
not been touched either directly or indirectly by the occurrence of this virulent 
disease in themselves, a family member, friend, or loved one.”91 
Consequently, most women are acutely aware of the statistics. One in eight 
women will develop breast cancer at some point in her life.92 The risk of 
developing breast cancer increases with age.93 Each year, over 200,000 
women are diagnosed with breast cancer and over 40,000 women die of breast 
cancer.94 However, when breast cancer is detected early and confined to the 
breast, the five-year survival rate is 98%.95 Women who are diagnosed with 
stage I or stage II breast cancer have well over a 90% five-year relative 
survival rate.96 In contrast, women diagnosed with stage IV breast cancer have 
a 22% five-year relative survival rate.97 The message behind the statistics is 
both sobering and empowering. Breast cancer, the opponent, is deadly, but 
women can successfully win the war if the cancer is detected early. Thus, early 
detection has been the key mantra for breast cancer advocates. Women are 
                                                                                                                     
 91 Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Cos., IP 92-1089-C, 1992 WL 421489, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 
Aug. 26, 1992). 
 92 AM. CANCER SOC’Y, BREAST CANCER 8 (2014), http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/ 
cid/documents/webcontent/003090-pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/94W7-KEQV] [hereinafter 
ACS, BREAST CANCER]. 
 93 Age, sex, personal history of cancer, BRCA1 and BRCA2 inherited genetic 
mutations, radiation exposure during youth, and family history of breast cancer are among 
the factors that have the greatest impact on breast cancer risk. See Risk Factors Summary 
Table of Relative Risks, SUSAN G. KOMEN, http://ww5.komen.org/BreastCancer/ 
RiskFactorsSummaryTable.html [http://perma.cc/D7Z9-JZTJ] (last updated Apr. 18, 
2013). In contrast, the major risk factors for heart disease are smoking, physical inactivity, 
obesity, and high blood pressure and cholesterol, which are largely controllable. See Know 
Your Risk Factors, WOMEN HEART, http://www.womenheart.org/?page=Support_ 
KnowRisk [http://perma.cc/XEE2-75FS]. 
 94 See ACS, BREAST CANCER, supra note 92, at 8–9. 
 95 See SUSAN G. KOMEN FOR THE CURE, FACTS FOR LIFE: BREAST CANCER FACTS 1 
(2009), http://www.komenscmm.org/assets/education-materials/breast-cancer-facts.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/P29P-URWQ]. 
 96 See ACS, BREAST CANCER, supra note 92, at 48. 
 97 Id. 
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encouraged to have regular mammograms.98 This encouragement is often 
coupled with the familiar rhetoric that “mammograms are the best weapon 
against breast cancer.”99 
A mammogram is a low-dose X-ray procedure that captures images of the 
breast that are used to evaluate breast tissue.100 A technician places the breast 
on a clear plastic plate and another plate firmly presses the breast from 
above.101 Together the plates flatten the breast, holding it still while the X-ray 
is taken.102 Typically, two X-ray pictures are taken of each breast and the 
pictures are sent to a radiologist for review.103 Mammography facilities are 
required to provide a written report of the results of the mammogram to both 
the patient and the health care provider who ordered the screening in writing 
within thirty days.104 Additionally, if the results are “Suspicious” or “Highly 
suggestive of malignancy,” the facility is required to make reasonable attempts 
to communicate the results to both the patient and the patient’s referring 
physician as soon as possible.105 
Mammography prevalence has increased from 29% in 1987 to 67% in 
2010.106 More than thirty-eight million mammograms are performed each year 
in the United States at over 8,000 facilities.107 In 1992, Congress passed the 
Mammography Quality Standards Act (MQSA). The MQSA ensures that 
radiology facilities offering mammography meet minimum quality 
                                                                                                                     
 98 See Guidelines for Early Detection of Breast Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
http://www.cancer.org/healthy/findcancerearly/cancerscreeningguidelines/american-
cancer-society-guidelines-for-the-early-detection-of-cancer [http://perma.cc/DVG6-SQX4] 
(last revised Oct. 20, 2015) (recommending a yearly mammogram for women beginning at 
age 40 and a clinical breast exam for women every three years for women in their 20s and 
30s). 
 99 See, e.g., Mary Duenwald, Putting Cancer Screening to the Test, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/15/health/putting-cancer-screening-to-
the-test.html [http://perma.cc/2ND9-7BPD] (quoting Lillie Shockney breast cancer 
survivor and registered nurse: “Mammography is still at this moment in time our best 
weapon for early detection. I cannot imagine a woman not pursuing it.”). 
 100 AM. CANCER SOC’Y, MAMMOGRAMS AND OTHER BREAST IMAGING TESTS 1, 7 
(2014), http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/cid/documents/webcontent/003178-pdf.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q35E-SQD3] [hereinafter ACS, MAMMOGRAMS]. 
 101 Id. 
 102 What Is a Mammogram and When Should I Get One?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/breast/basic_info/mammograms.htm 
[http://perma.cc/JR7L-72TJ] (last updated Oct. 31, 2013). 
 103 ACS, MAMMOGRAMS, supra note 100, at 3–4. 
 104 21 C.F.R. § 900.12(c)(2), (3)(i) (2011). 
 105 Id. § 900.12(c)(2), (3)(ii). 
 106 See AM. CANCER SOC’Y, BREAST CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2013–2014, at 20 
(2013), http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@research/documents/document/acspc-
042725.pdf [http://perma.cc/T6TD-SHTF]. 
 107 See Radiation-Emitting Products: 2015 Scorecard Statistics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/MammographyQualityStandards 
ActandProgram/DocumentArchives/ucm432658.htm [http://perma.cc/6Z9U-A6XV] (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2015). 
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standards.108 Mammograms cost on average between $50 and $200,109 and 
annual spending on mammograms reaches nearly eight billion dollars in the 
U.S.110 Yet, despite its widespread use, mammography has its drawbacks. For 
dense women like Cappello, the most serious drawback is that mammography 
is not as effective at detecting cancer when the breast tissue is dense. 
Breasts are made up of glandular (milk ducts), fat (adipose), and 
supportive tissue with a system of lymph nodes running through the center.111 
Breast density refers to the amount of fatty and fibro-glandular tissue seen in 
the breast as viewed on mammography film.112 Breasts are considered dense 
when there is more glandular tissue than fatty and supportive tissue.113 On 
mammography images, dense breast tissue looks white, just like cancer.114 
Thus, dense breast tissue can obscure cancerous tumors. For dense women, the 
sensitivity of film mammography is between 62% and 68%.115 In comparison, 
the sensitivity of film mammography is greater than 85% for women with fatty 
breasts. The main goal of any cancer-screening test is to correctly identify 
those individuals who have cancer.116 How well a screening test correctly 
identifies with the disease is referred to as sensitivity.117 When sensitivity is 
high, very few cases are missed. Thus, for dense women, mammography is 
significantly less sensitive, which means that their breast cancer is less likely 
to be visible on mammographic film. 
                                                                                                                     
 108 The FDA is the agency charged with certifying mammography facilities. See 
Mammography Quality Standards Act (MQSA) of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263b (2012). 
 109 See Melinda Beck, New Screening Tests for Hard-to-Spot Breast Cancers, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-screening-tests-for-hard-to-
spot-breast-cancers-1424731497 [http://perma.cc/WX36-5UNR] (discussing the cost of 
various screenings). Because screening mammograms are deemed a preventative service, it 
is typically covered without copayments or deductibles for women with private insurance. 
In addition, Medicaid and Medicare both cover the cost of the mammogram screenings. See 
ACS, MAMMOGRAMS, supra note 100, at 6.  
 110 See Denise Grady, 3-D Mammography Test Appears to Improve Breast Cancer 
Detection Rate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/health/ 
breast-cancer-3d-mammography-test-x-ray.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/W298-AZ94]. 
 111 See VALERIE F. ANDOLINA & SHELLY L. LILLÉ, MAMMOGRAPHIC IMAGING 71 (3d 
ed. 2010). 
 112 See AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, N.J. SECTION, DISCUSSING 
BREAST DENSITY 3, https://www.acog.org/-/media/Sections/NJ/DiscussingBreast 
Density.pdf [http://perma.cc/3XR4-6LYN] [hereinafter DISCUSSING BREAST DENSITY]. 
 113 See MIRIAM E. NELSON & JENNIFER ACKERMAN, THE STRONG WOMEN’S GUIDE TO 
TOTAL HEALTH 251 (2010). 
 114 See Grady, supra note 46 (“On mammograms, dense breasts look white, and so 
does cancer, so the tissue can hide tumors. Fatty breasts show up mostly black, so tumors 
stand out.”). 
 115 See Priscilla J. Slanetz et al., Breast-Density Legislation—Practical 
Considerations, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 593, 593 (2015). 
 116 Id. 
 117 See BRANI VIDAKOVIC, STATISTICS FOR BIOENGINEERING SCIENCES 111 (2011) 
(explaining the difference between test sensitivity and specificity). 
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Breast density is typically visually determined by the radiologist who 
reads the mammogram.118 The American College of Radiology defines breast 
density using four categories: (1) the breasts are almost entirely fatty; (2) there 
are scattered areas of fibro-glandular density; (3) the breasts are 
heterogeneously dense; and (4) the breasts are extremely dense.119 10% of 
women have almost entirely fatty (non-dense) breasts and 10% of women have 
extremely dense breasts.120 Thus, the vast majority of women have some 
degree of dense breast tissue. 
Figure 1: Breast Density Categories from fatty, non-dense (left side) to 
extremely dense (right side)121 
 
 
Specifically, most women have breasts with a combination of glandular 
and fibrous tissue.122 Forty percent of women have scattered areas of fibro-
                                                                                                                     
 118 See Dana S. Al Mousa et al., How Mammographic Breast Density Affects 
Radiologists’ Visual Search Patterns, 21 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 1386, 1386 (2014) 
(explaining how breast density affects visual perceptions of radiologists interpreting 
mammograms). 




 120 See DISCUSSING BREAST DENSITY, supra note 112, at 3. 
 121 AM. CANCER SOC’Y, BREAST DENSITY AND YOUR MAMMOGRAM REPORT 1 (July 
2015), http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@editorial/documents/document/acspc-
039989.pdf [http://perma.cc/9D2G-5QBC] (Copyright © 2015 American Cancer Society. 
All rights reserved.).  
 122 Shedding Light on Breast Density, AM. COLL. OF RADIOLOGY (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.acr.org/News-Publications/News/News-Articles/2012/ACR-Bulletin/201210-
Shedding-Light-on-Breast-Density [http://perma.cc/TMB7-AKC4]. 
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glandular tissue, and 40% of women have heterogeneously dense breast 
tissue.123 The 50% of women who have either heterogeneously dense or 
extremely dense breasts are considered clinically dense.124 However, breast 
density is not static. Dense breast tissue tends to decrease with age.125 
Figure 2: Breast Density Among Total U.S. Adult Female Population126 
 
 
As the figure illustrates, a large percentage of women have dense breast 
tissue. While scores of middle-aged women are told to have annual screening 
mammograms without any qualifications,127 few dense women are ever told 
about their breast density until they are diagnosed with advanced breast 
cancer. There is no disclaimer that warns dense women that a mammogram 
might not detect their cancer. For density advocates like Cappello, who had 
years of annual mammograms with undetected cancer lurking and growing 
inside of their dense breast tissue, women simply need to be told when they 
                                                                                                                     
 123 See DISCUSSING BREAST DENSITY, supra note 112, at 3. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Louisville’s First 3D Mammography—Digital Breast Tomosynthesis, LOUISVILLE 
MAG., Oct. 2012, at 16, 16 (“Approximately 75 percent of women in their 40s have dense 
breasts . . . . This percentage typically decreases with age, although close to half of all 
women in their 60s still have dense breast tissue.”). 
 126 See DISCUSSING BREAST DENSITY, supra note 112, at 3. 
 127 See Consumer Reports, Some Cancer Screening Tests Are Worthwhile, but Others 
Are Rarely Warranted, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/health-science/some-cancer-screening-tests-are-worthwhile-but-others-are-rarely-
warranted/2014/09/22/e135a334-0c47-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html [http://perma.cc/ 
KDG7-6L95] (noting that “[a] few years ago, women were usually told to get annual 
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have dense breasts.128 Empowered with the knowledge that they have dense 
breasts, Ms. Cappello and fellow advocates believe that women will elect to 
undergo additional screenings.129 
Options for additional screenings have traditionally included a breast 
ultrasound or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which can sometimes detect 
tumors missed by traditional mammography.130 Ultrasounds create images of 
the breast using high-frequency sound waves and can cost a couple of hundred 
dollars per screening.131 In contrast, a MRI can easily cost more than 
$1,000.132 In addition, MRIs are time consuming; they can take up to an hour 
to perform.133 The technology uses magnets and radio waves to provide cross-
sectional images of the breast.134 
Recently, two new technologies have entered the market. Tomosynthesis 
is now covered by Medicare but is still rarely covered by insurers.135 
Approved in 2011 by the FDA, tomosynthesis “takes many X-rays at different 
angles to create a three-dimensional image of the breast.”136 Only a small 
portion of mammographic centers offer tomosynthesis. As a consequence, it is 
not yet a widely available option for women.137 Molecular breast imaging—or 
MBI—is also a promising new technology. MBI requires injecting patients 
with a radioactive tracer.138 The cancer cells absorb the tracer and “light up” 
when viewed with a small camera.139 
                                                                                                                     
 128 See Grady, supra note 46 (quoting Ms. Cappello: “I want to help other women. I 
can’t help myself. My cancer should have been detected at a much earlier stage.”). 
 129 See id. (reporting that Cappello would have had supplemental screenings if she had 
been told that she had dense breasts). 
 130 See, e.g., Wendie A. Berg et al., Detection of Breast Cancer with Addition of 
Annual Screening Ultrasound or a Single Screening MRI to Mammography in Women with 
Elevated Breast Cancer Risk, 307 JAMA 1394, 1394 (2012). 
 131 See Victoria Colliver, Law May Encourage Mammogram Alternatives, SFGATE, 
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Law-may-encourage-mammogram-alternatives-
3901022.php [http://perma.cc/HCF7-WA9Y] (last updated Sept. 27, 2012) (noting that 
“automated ultrasound costs between $180,000 and $250,000—about half the price of a 
digital mammogram unit—and patients are typically charged $200 to $300 per screening if 
it’s not covered by insurance”). 
 132 See Beck, supra note 109. 
 133 See ACS, MAMMOGRAMS, supra note 100, at 18.  
 134 Id. at 17. 
 135 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PREVENTIVE & SCREENING 
SERVS.—UPDATE—INTENSIVE BEHAVIORAL THERAPY FOR OBESITY, SCREENING DIGITAL 
TOMOSYNTHESIS MAMMOGRAPHY, AND ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATED WITH SCREENING 
COLONOSCOPY 5 (2013), http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/MM8874.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2VB-ZL3J]. 
 136 Grady, supra note 110. 
 137 Id. (noting that “[a]bout 1,100 of 13,500 mammography units in the United States 
perform tomosynthesis”). 
 138 See Beck, supra note 109. 
 139 Id. 
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In spite of the plethora of additional screening options, physician groups 
have not endorsed routine supplemental screenings for dense women. The 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists does not recommend 
routine use of supplemental screening tests for “women with dense breasts 
who are asymptomatic and have no additional risk factors.”140 The American 
College of Radiology’s position statement notes that “there is no randomized 
trial data that shows that adding either ultrasound or MRI to mammography 
screening saves lives.”141 Nonetheless, density advocates believe that dense 
women should have the opportunity to decide for themselves whether or not a 
supplemental screening is in their best interests. Of course, to even get to the 
point where a woman is having a conversation about supplemental screenings 
with her physician, she needs to be informed that she is dense. Thus, for 
advocates, empowering women begins with notifying women about their 
breast density. 
III. PATIENT AUTONOMY 
At its core, autonomy means self-rule.142 Although autonomy has deep 
roots in western philosophy,143 patient autonomy is a relatively new concept. 
The Hippocratic tradition was based on a covenantal relationship between the 
physician and patient.144 The patient was charged with obeying and trusting 
the physician who in turn was encouraged to aspire to personal virtues of 
holiness and purity.145 In addition, physicians were expected to demonstrate 
“compassion, knowledge, and dedication to the patient’s welfare” and to 
follow professional ethics.146 The American Medical Association’s first Code 
of Ethics in 1847 warned patients that their “obedience . . . to the prescriptions 
                                                                                                                     
 140 AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, MANAGEMENT OF WOMEN WITH 
DENSE BREASTS DIAGNOSED BY MAMMOGRAPHY, Committee Opinion No. 625, at 1 (Mar. 
2015), http://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Gynecologic-
Practice/co625.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20151025T0119315414 [http://perma.cc/K7BV-HTDE]. 
 141 ACR Statement on Reporting Breast Density in Mammography Reports and Patient 
Summaries, AM. C. RADIOLOGY (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.acr.org/About-Us/Media-
Center/Position-Statements/Position-Statements-Folder/Statement-on-Reporting-Breast-
Density-in-Mammography-Reports-and-Patient-Summaries [http://perma.cc/A88W-UP6W] 
[hereinafter ACR, Reporting Breast Density]. 
 142 See Arthur Kuflik, The Inalienability of Autonomy, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 271, 272 
(1984) (“To be ‘autonomous’ is (literally) to be self-legislating or self-regulating.”). 
 143 See generally, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS (Robert Paul Wolff ed., Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) 
(1785); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale 
Univ. Press 2003) (1859). 
 144 See Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts 
of Consent to, and Refusal of, Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL 
MED. 1, 14 (1996) (“Central to a covenantal relationship is the ethical principle of trust 
with its corresponding duties and obligations.”). 
 145 Id. at 12. 
 146 Id. 
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of [their] physician should be prompt and implicit. [They] should never permit 
[their] own crude opinions . . . to influence [their] attention to [their 
physicians].”147 
Consent to medical treatment as a legal concept developed within the 
framework of the law of trespass. Two of the earliest cases to discuss the 
notion of informed consent involved female patients. In Pratt v. Davis,148 
which was decided in 1905, the court declared that “under a free government 
at least, the free citizen’s first and greatest right, which underlies all others—
the right to the inviolability of his person . . . necessarily forbids a physician or 
surgeon . . . to violate without permission the bodily integrity of his 
patient.”149 In Pratt, Mr. Davis placed his wife, Mrs. Davis, in a sanitarium for 
treatment for epilepsy.150 While examining Mrs. Davis, Dr. Pratt found that 
her “uterus was small, that it was lacerated and pinched, and that the condition 
of the last inch of the rectum was bad.”151 Dr. Pratt performed an operation.152 
Mrs. Davis returned home, but Dr. Pratt soon informed Mr. Davis that Mrs. 
Davis should return for further treatment.153 When Mrs. Davis returned to the 
sanitarium, Dr. Pratt performed a hysterectomy on Mrs. Davis without 
informing her or her husband.154 
As a result, Mr. Davis, on behalf of his wife, filed an action of trespass 
against Dr. Pratt.155 Dr. Pratt did not argue that he obtained consent.156 In fact, 
he readily admitted that he did not obtain consent from Mrs. Davis.157 He 
stated, “I worked her deliberately, systematically, taking chances which she 
did not realize the full aspect of, deliberately and calmly deceived the woman. 
That is, I did not tell her the whole truth.”158 Instead, Dr. Pratt argued that it 
would be an injustice to hold him liable because he used his best efforts to heal 
Mrs. Davis. Dr. Pratt stated that, in his opinion, the surgery was “proper and 
essential to her welfare” and that “the employment of the physician or surgeon 
gives him implied license to do whatever in the exercise of his judgment may 
be necessary.”159 He further argued that when a patient places herself under 
the care of a physician for treatment that “upon his authority, she thereby in 
                                                                                                                     
 147 Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 73 (1994) (alterations in original) (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE 
OF ETHICS (1847)). 
 148 Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905), aff’d, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). 
 149 Id. at 166. 
 150 Id. at 168. 
 151 Id.  
 152 Id. at 170. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Pratt, 118 Ill. App. at 171–72. 
 155 Id. at 161–62. 
 156 Id. at 170. 
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 166. 
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law consents that he may perform such operation as in his best judgment is 
proper and essential to her welfare.”160 
Similarly, in Mohr v. Williams, the patient sued her doctor for performing 
an operation without her consent.161 The physician had obtained consent to 
operate on her right ear but, while she was under anesthesia, decided to 
operate on her left ear because it looked more diseased.162 The physician 
argued that he should not be held liable because “plaintiff’s left ear was in fact 
diseased, in a condition dangerous and threatening to her health, [and] the 
operation was necessary.”163 
In both Pratt and Mohr, the physicians acted for the benefit of their 
patients. They approached patient care with the commonly held belief that 
“patients are neither emotionally nor intellectually equipped to play a 
significant role in decisions affecting their medical fate . . . and that 
disclosures of uncertainty, gloomy prognosis and dire risks often seriously 
undermine cure.”164 The courts rejected the arguments made by the physicians 
and held that performing a surgery without obtaining the patient’s consent 
constituted a battery.165 Thereafter, case law permitted recovery against 
physicians who failed to obtain consent prior to performing a medical 
procedure. 
Under a theory of battery, the law places a narrow obligation on 
physicians to inform the patient about what the doctor plans to do.166 Thus, 
when a physician performs a procedure without telling the patient basic details 
about the proposed treatment, courts treat the physician’s actions as 
nonconsensual contact amounting to a battery.167 In order to prevail in a 
battery action premised on lack of consent, the plaintiff must prove that the 
physician performed a procedure without obtaining the patient’s consent.168 
                                                                                                                     
 160 Pratt, 118 Ill. App. at 166. 
 161 Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 12–13 (Minn. 1905). 
 162 Id. at 13. 
 163 Id. at 15. 
 164 See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale? Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 
137, 148 (1977). 
 165 See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 16 (holding that the surgery was a “violent assault, not a 
mere pleasantry; and, even though no negligence is shown, it was wrongful and 
unlawful”); Pratt, 118 Ill. App. at 173. 
 166 See Slater v. Baker (1767) 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (KB) [862] (stating that “indeed it is 
reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be done to him, that he may take 
courage and put himself in such a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation”). 
 167 See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1972) (explaining that “[w]here a 
doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently 
performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a 
clear case of battery”); Mohr, 104 N.W. at 16 (holding that physician was liable for battery 
because consent to an operation on the patient’s right ear did not authorize surgery on the 
left ear); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (stating that 
“the wrong complained of is not merely negligence,” but trespass of the body). 
 168 See, e.g., Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8 (noting that “in a battery count, . . . the patient must 
merely prove failure to give informed consent and a mere touching absent consent”). 
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For nearly the next fifty years, the duty of doctors was limited to getting 
basic consent for proposed treatments. The law did not begin to establish a 
duty upon physicians to procure informed consent from patients until the end 
of the 1950s.169 This new notion of informed consent can be traced to the 
belief that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body.”170 Modern informed 
consent cases are based on principals of negligence, although egregious cases 
may still be brought under a theory of battery.171 
Sounding the cause of action in negligence rather than battery became 
more appealing to courts for a number reasons. First, when physicians are 
acting in good faith for the benefit of the patient, their conduct is not morally 
blameworthy.172 Second, in cases where the patient is alleging that she was not 
informed of the risks of treatments, the act complained of does not fall within 
the traditional notions of unconsented touching.173 Finally, courts had 
concerns about whether a physician’s malpractice insurance provides coverage 
for an intentional act like battery.174 For these reasons, there was discomfort 
with potentially forcing physicians to pay out-of-pocket for what was 
essentially, in the eyes of the court, a negligence claim.175 
The first modern case to fully embrace a cause of action for informed 
consent involved a plaintiff who had breast cancer.176 Irma Natanson was 
diagnosed with breast cancer and had a radical mastectomy of her left 
breast.177 As a precautionary measure, her physician also removed her 
                                                                                                                     
 169 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1957) (discussing that physicians have an obligation to disclose what treatment is intended 
and information that addresses the question of whether or not the treatment should be 
provided).  
 170 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93). 
 171 See, e.g., Roberson v. Provident House, 576 So. 2d 992, 994 (La. 1991) (finding 
that nurse committed a battery when she inserted an internal catheter despite the plaintiff 
advising her of previous bad experiences with catheters and begging her to stop); 
Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 522 (Tenn. 1998) (holding for plaintiff in an action 
alleging medical battery when doctor failed to obtain consent before attempting to extract 
all thirty-two of the plaintiff’s teeth). 
 172 See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis. 1973) (“[T]he act 
complained of is surely not of an antisocial nature usually associated with the tort of 
assault and battery or battery. While the unauthorized removal of an organ yet fits the 
concept of battery, the failure to adequately advise of potential negative ramifications of a 
treatment does not.”). 
 173 See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8 (“[T]he doctor in obtaining consent may have failed to 
meet his due care duty to disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action should 
be pleaded in negligence.”).  
 174 See Trogun, 207 N.W.2d at 313. 
 175 Id.  
 176 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Kan. 1960). 
 177 Id. at 1106. 
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fallopian tubes and ovaries.178 Her surgeon referred her to Dr. Kline, the 
defendant, for radiation therapy to reduce the likelihood that the cancer would 
reoccur.179 With Mrs. Natanson’s consent, Dr. Kline ordered and oversaw 
administration of doses of cobalt radiation therapy.180 
As a result of the cobalt radiation therapy, the skin, flesh and muscles 
beneath Mrs. Natanson’s left arm “sloughed away” and “ribs of her left chest 
were so burned that they became necrotic, or dead.”181 Dr. Kline testified that 
he was “‘taking a chance’ with the treatment he proposed to administer.”182 He 
also acknowledged that “such treatment involved a ‘calculated risk’ [and that] 
there was always a danger of injury in the treatment of cancer.”183 Dr. Kline 
never testified that he informed Mrs. Natanson of the risks associated with 
cobalt therapy.184 Presumably, Dr. Kline believed that it was his job to weigh 
the risks and benefits of cobalt therapy and that it was the role of Mrs. 
Natanson to trust his advice. Mrs. Natanson requested that the jury be 
instructed that the “the relationship between physician and patient is a 
fiduciary one [that] requires the physician to make a full disclosure to the 
patient,” and that failure to disclose hazards of particular medical treatment 
renders the doctor negligent.185 The trial court refused the instruction and the 
jury rendered a verdict for the defendants.186 Mrs. Natanson appealed. The 
Kansas Supreme Court held: 
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to 
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an 
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise, the 
physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure . . . in order to 
induce his patient’s consent.187  
Most importantly, the court in Natanson stressed that “[a] doctor might well 
believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the 
law does not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient 
by any form of artifice or deception.”188 
Thus, modern jurisprudence recognizes the right of patients to make self-
directed choices about their course of treatment and medical care. In order to 
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 179 Id. at 1095. 
 180 Id. at 1095–96. 
 181 Id. at 1098 (quoting the trial court’s summary of the pleadings for the jury 
instructions). 
 182 Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1100. 
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facilitate patient autonomy, the law places a duty upon doctors to obtain 
“informed consent” prior to treatment. Truly informing patients about their 
diagnosis, all their risks factors, all possible risks of treatment, however 
remote, and treatment alternatives, would be an arduous and impossible task 
for physicians. Thus, most jurisdictions require physicians to inform patients 
of the relevant facts without which an informed choice would be 
impossible.189 
In a slight majority of jurisdictions, the content of disclosure is evaluated 
by what a reasonable physician would disclose.190 Ultimately, informed 
consent jurisprudence seeks to ensure that patients who want to make 
autonomous decisions are given the information that they need by their 
physicians. For that reason, potential liability for failure to disclose is, in 
theory, supposed to deter physicians from failing to adequately disclose 
relevant information to their patients. Despite the specter of a lawsuit, women 
have struggled to get information from their physicians about breast cancer.191 
Early breast cancer advocates fought for information about treatment 
options.192 Namely, they wanted to ensure that women were making an 
informed choice between mastectomy and a lumpectomy, which preserves the 
breast but has a slightly higher rate of recurrence.193 Similarly, dense women 
want to ensure that women are making an informed choice with respect to 
utilizing screening mammograms or other screening technology. They want 
                                                                                                                     
 189 See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: 
The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 430 (2006). 
 190 See, e.g., Craig v. Borcicky, 557 So. 2d 1253, 1258 (Ala. 1990); Eady v. Lansford, 
92 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Ark. 2002); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89–90 (Ark. 1980); 
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425 N.E.2d 450, 458–59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 101, 
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Lee, 568 N.W.2d 510, 513–14 (Mich. 1997); Walls v. Shreck, 658 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Neb. 
2003); Weber v. McCoy, 950 P.2d 548, 552 (Wyo. 1997). Alternatively some jurisdictions 
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significant. See, e.g., Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 494–99 (Haw. 1995); Rook v. Trout, 
747 P.2d 61, 66–67 (Idaho 1987); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 
361–62 (Iowa 1987); Harnish v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242–44 
(Mass. 1982); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So. 2d 488, 493–94 (Miss. 1987); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 
295 A.2d 676, 688–90 (R.I. 1972); Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 374–75 (S.D. 
1985). 
 191 Breast cancer advocates believed that their struggle to get adequate information was 
because of their sex. See Montini, supra note 39, at 92 (explaining that because “the 
majority of physicians who treated breast cancer were men, and the patients primarily 
women, sexism was disabling the system . . . [and w]omen advocated for legislative action 
to protect them as a special class of patients”). 
 192 See E. Dale Collins et al., Can Women with Early-Stage Breast Cancer Make an 
Informed Decision for Mastectomy?, 27 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 519, 524 (2009).  
 193 See Montini, supra note 39, at 90–91 (noting that breast cancer advocates were 
alarmed at the high rates of mascectomy in spite of the fact that survival rates for 
lumpectomies were the same). 
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women to be given information about their breast density and to appreciate 
and understand the limitations of mammography. 
A. Legislating a Standard Notification 
The undisputed goal of dense breast tissue notification legislation is to 
empower women. The stories of dense women are all remarkably similar. 
After years of having regular mammograms, no single doctor had ever 
bothered to tell them that they had dense breasts until after they were 
diagnosed with advanced breast cancer.194 Thus, these dense women had no 
idea that the density of their breast tissue could obscure cancer on their 
mammogram, and they did not know that more sensitive screenings could 
potentially find tumors missed by the mammogram. According to density 
advocate Salmeron of Texas, this was inexcusable.195 
The remedy of course is obvious. For dense breast tissue advocates, 
women have a right to know if they have dense breast tissue so that they can 
seek out supplemental screenings. Thus, the power is derived not simply from 
being given knowledge, but equally from having the ability to act on that 
knowledge.196 Nancy Cappello, the founder of Are You Dense Advocacy, 
rather succinctly states that density notification laws “give consumers 
information about the limitations of mammography to detect cancer while 
promoting conversations about personalized screening surveillance with 
health-care providers. Women then become the boss of their breasts.”197 
Unsurprisingly, the medical community has not warmly embraced density 
notification laws. Some doctors have complained that the law will “provoke 
anxiety” in women198 and “may confuse women, scare some needlessly.”199 
On the surface, these arguments seem reminiscent of the arguments forty years 
ago when physicians wanted to choose radical mastectomy for their women 
patients without giving them adequate options.200 Such arguments seem 
paternalistic and fail to recognize the right of women to make autonomous 
decisions about their health. However, not all arguments against the 
                                                                                                                     
 194 See supra pp. 856–60 (discussing the stories of density advocates). 
 195 See supra p. 858. 
 196 See Nancy M. Cappello, Who’s the Boss of Our Breast Health Information?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-m-cappello/ 
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notifications are blatantly paternalistic. Some medical professionals have 
opposed the legislation on grounds that density notification laws will prompt 
too many referrals for costly supplemental screenings which have high false–
positive rates.201 A recent study estimated that for every 10,000 dense women 
between the ages of fifty and seventy-four screened with a supplemental 
ultrasound that about four breast cancer deaths would be prevented, but an 
extra 3,500 biopsies would also be performed.202 In any event, just like the 
generation of women before them, dense women seek a legislative remedy in 
order to overcome the long-standing physician temptation to withhold 
information from women. 
For density notification advocates, notification laws open the door for 
women to have a more informed conversation with her physician about 
possible next steps.203 Advocates believe that women can evaluate the pitfalls 
of supplemental screenings and should be given the opportunity to make the 
right decision for themselves. Thus, density notification statutes compel 
physicians to disclose breast density information in the lay summary of the 
mammogram report. 
Disclosure of this information is seemingly not a departure from the ideals 
annunciated in Natanson and its prodigy. The law clearly recognizes that 
patients should be provided with risk information by physicians. The major 
risk of dense breast tissue is that it can obscure cancer. Thus, it seems obvious 
that women who receive mammograms and who have dense breast tissue 
should be alerted to this fact. In almost every state that has passed density 
legislation, women have angrily told lawmakers that they should have been 
told that they had dense breasts before, ultimately, being diagnosed with breast 
cancer.204 Their anger at being kept in the dark by their physicians has fueled 
their desire to help other women by ensuring that women are told when they 
                                                                                                                     
 201 See Slanetz et al., supra note 115, at 594 (noting that the high false positive rates 
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have dense breasts. There can be little doubt that disclosing information about 
breast density to women empowers them. 
B. Undermining Women 
While the desire to inform women about breast density is laudable, as 
currently implemented, most notification laws undermine women rather than 
empower them. States have taken four approaches in drafting the required 
notification: (1) directive; (2) moderately directive; (3) mildly directive; and 
(4) neutral. As will be discussed, the highly directive and moderately directive 
approaches usurp the power of women to make independent unbiased choices 
about their medical care. While all the statutes purport to empower women, in 
practice, directive statutes to varying degrees direct women towards a specific 
path. In other words, states that utilize directive dense breast notifications are 
nudging, prodding, or pushing women to act. Even more troubling, they are 
pushing women towards supplemental testing without requiring insurers to pay 
for it. Only two states with density notification laws, Connecticut205 and New 
Jersey206 also mandate that insurers pay for supplemental screenings for 
women with dense breasts. 
Table 1: Notification Differences by State 


































Alabama    X 
Arizona   X  
California   X  
Connecticut  X   
Delaware   X  
Hawaii    X 
Maryland   X  
Massachusetts    X 
Michigan    X 
Minnesota   X  
Missouri  X   
Nevada  X   
                                                                                                                     
 205 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503(a)(2)(A) (West 2012). 
 206 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-6g(a)(2), :48E-35.4(a) (West Supp. 2015). 
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New Jersey   X  
New York    X 
N. Carolina   X  
N. Dakota X    
Ohio X    
Oregon   X  
Pennsylvania   X  
Rhode Island   X  
Tennessee   X  
Texas  X   
Virginia    X 
1. Highly Directive Notifications 
Alabama,207 Hawaii,208 Massachusetts,209 Michigan,210 New York,211 and 
Virginia212 require that patients be provided with a highly directive breast 
density notification. For example Alabama’s statute directs physicians to 
include the following statement: 
Your mammogram shows that your breast tissue is dense. Dense breast 
tissue is very common and is not abnormal. However, dense breast tissue may 
make it harder to find cancer on a mammogram and may also be associated 
with an increased risks of breast cancer. This information about the result of 
your mammogram is given to you to raise your awareness. Use this 
information to talk to your doctor about your own risks for breast cancer. At 
that time, ask your doctor if more screening tests might be useful, based on 
your risk. A report of your results was sent to your physician.213 
This approach is characterized as highly directive because the notification 
informs women of the risks associated with breast density and directs women 
                                                                                                                     
 207 See ALA. CODE § 22-13-71(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
 208 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 321-46(a) (West Supp. 2014).  
 209 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 5Q(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). 
 210 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.13524(1) (West Supp. 2015). 
 211 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2404-c (McKinney Supp. 2015). 
 212 See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-229 (Supp. 2015). 
 213 ALA. CODE § 22-13-71(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
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to “use” the information provided about dense breast tissue to “ask” her doctor 
if more screening tests might be useful. Thus, highly directive notifications go 
beyond informing women that dense breast tissue may obscure cancer on 
mammograms. These statutes dictate to women how they should use the 
information given.214 
States which utilize highly directive notifications have replaced 
paternalistic doctors, who withhold information from their women patients, 
with legislative edicts that adjure women to ask their physicians about 
additional screenings. Such statutes do not empower women, they undermine 
women. States which choose to inform and command woman are substituting 
the judgment of legislators for the judgment of women. Legislators are 
predetermining for women how they should use risk information about dense 
breast tissue. This undermines patient autonomy, albeit this time at the hands 
of the legislature. 
2. Moderately Directive Notifications 
Moderately directive notification statutes are less paternalistic than the 
highly directive variety. Arizona,215 California,216 Delaware,217 Maryland,218 
Minnesota,219 New Jersey,220 North Carolina,221 Oregon,222 Pennsylvania,223 
Rhode Island,224 and Tennessee225 require moderately directive dense breast 
tissue notifications. Arizona’s statute is illustrative of the path followed by 
most moderately directive notification. The statute requires that patients 
receive the following notice: 
Your mammogram indicates that you have dense breast tissue. Dense 
breast tissue is common and is found in fifty per cent of women. However, 
dense breast tissue can make it more difficult to detect cancers in the breast 
by mammography and may also be associated with an increased risk of breast 
cancer. This information is being provided to raise your awareness and to 
encourage you to discuss with your health care providers your dense breast 
                                                                                                                     
 214 Massachusetts’ notification requirements are also highly directive. However unlike 
the other states Massachusetts provides a list of elements which should be included in the 
notification instead mandating the use of specific language. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, 
§ 5Q(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). 
 215 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-415(A) (Supp. 2014).  
 216 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123222.3(a) (West Supp. 2015). 
 217 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3201A(a) (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch. 
193). 
 218 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-115(c)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
 219 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.1212(2) (West Supp. 2015). 
 220 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2-184.3 (West Supp. 2015). 
 221 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-215.5(a) (2013). 
 222 See OR. ADMIN. R. 333-106-0735 (2015). 
 223 See 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10229.2(b) (West Supp. 2015).  
 224 See 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-12.9-2 (Supp. 2014). 
 225 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-245(b) (Supp. 2014). 
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tissue and other breast cancer risk factors. Together, you and your physician 
can decide if additional screening options are right for you. A report of your 
results was sent to your physician.226 
Moderately directive statutes inform women of the risks associated with 
breast cancer. In addition, these statutes explicitly contemplate that women 
will use the provided information to make an informed choice about additional 
screenings with the aid of her physician. Moderately directive statutes 
conceive of a world in which all women value shared decision-making with 
their doctors. These statutes embrace the ideals exposed by the informed 
consent jurisprudence. 
However, true autonomy is self-directed. Not every individual desires to 
participate in a shared-decision making with their physician. Studies have 
shown that different racial and ethnic groups view medical decision making 
differently. For example, one study, which examined patient preferences, 
found that African-American and Hispanic patients were more likely to prefer 
that physicians make medical decisions for them.227 This same study also 
found that more affluent patients tend to have a strong preference for having 
an active role in medical decision making.228 Another famous study by Dr. 
Leslie Blackhall found that non-European ethnic groups often do not value 
individual autonomy when making medical decisions to the same degree as 
their European counterparts.229 Blackhall found that “[a]utonomy is not 
viewed as empowering. Rather, it is seen as isolating and burdensome to 
patients . . . .”230 Further, in another study of African-American patients, 
researchers found that nearly half of African-American patients wanted their 
provider to make medical decisions for them.231 
Combined, these studies call into question whether assuming that 
constituents want to participate in shared decision-making is wise. Density 
notification advocates are strikingly similar. The advocates tend to be middle-
aged, middle to upper-middle class white women. Yet, the legislation affects 
all women. In our pluralistic society, there are substantial segments of the 
patient population who do not identify dominant values as their own.232 
Presuming a preference for shared decision-making, undermines women who 
                                                                                                                     
 226 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-415(A) (Supp. 2014). 
 227 See, e.g., Wendy Levinson et al., Not All Patients Want to Participate in Decision 
Making: A National Study of Public Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531, 533 
(2005).  
 228 Id. at 531. 
 229 See Leslie Blackhall et al., Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Patient Autonomy, 274 
JAMA 820, 824 (1995). 
 230 Id. 
 231 See Alexia M. Torke et al., African American Patients’ Perspectives on Medical 
Decision Making, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 525, 528 (2004). 
 232 Even when researchers have studied decision making in mostly white women, they 
have found distinct preferences. See, e.g., Penny F. Pierce, Deciding on Breast Cancer 
Treatment: A Description of Decision Behavior, 42 NURSING RES. 22, 25 (1993). 
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prefer to leave medical decision making in the exclusive hands of their 
physician. 
3. Mildly Directive Notifications 
Connecticut,233 Missouri234, Nevada235, and Texas,236 require a mildly 
directive density notification. Mildly directive density notification statues 
inform women that having dense breasts may obscure breast cancer. In 
addition, these notifications alert women to the fact that supplemental 
screenings may be suggested by their physician and may be beneficial. For 
example, Missouri’s statute requires the following notice: 
If your mammogram demonstrates that you have dense breast tissue, 
which could hide abnormalities, and you have other risk factors for breast 
cancer that have been identified, you might benefit from supplemental 
screening tests that may be suggested by your ordering physician. Dense 
breast tissue, in and of itself, is a relatively common condition. Therefore, 
this information is not provided to cause undue concern, but rather to raise 
your awareness and to promote discussion with your physician regarding the 
presence of other risk factors, in addition to dense breast tissue. A report of 
your mammography results will be sent to you and your physician. You 
should contact your physician if you have any questions or concerns 
regarding this report.237 
Unlike the moderately directive notifications, mildly directive 
notifications do not presume shared decision-making. Instead, mildly directive 
notifications “promote discussion.” The discussion that mildly directive 
statutes seem to promote is, however, directed. The average person receiving 
the notice would assume that a discussion with their physician about 
supplemental screening is forthcoming. If the physician fails to discuss the 
issue, then the notification has at least flagged the issue for women. Unlike, 
the moderately directive or highly directive notifications, the mildly directive 
density notifications empower women without strongly suggesting a 
predetermined outcome. 
4. Neutral Notifications 
While mildly directive density notifications can be said to nudge women 
to discuss supplemental screening options with their physicians, neutral 
notifications advise women that dense breast tissue can obscure cancer without 
                                                                                                                     
 233 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503(c) (West 2012). 
 234 MO. ANN. STAT. § 192.769(1) (West Supp. 2015). 
 235 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457.1857(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 236 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 86.013(a) (West Supp. 2014). 
 237 MO. ANN. STAT. § 192.769(1). 
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suggesting supplemental screenings. North Dakota238 and Ohio239 are the only 
two states that have adopted this approach. The North Dakota statute requires 
a notice stating that “the patient has dense breast tissue, that this dense breast 
tissue may make it more difficult to detect cancer on a mammogram, and that 
this dense breast tissue may increase the patient’s risk of breast cancer.”240 
This language is completely non-directive. It does not direct a woman to 
engage in a discussion with her physician nor does it suggest that a 
supplemental screening may be necessary. The language required by the North 
Dakota merely provides information about breast density and allows the dense 
woman to determine what, if anything, she should do with that information. 
The language required by Ohio is slightly more directive. The Ohio statute 
requires the following notice: 
Your mammogram demonstrates that you have dense breast tissue, which 
could hide abnormalities. Dense breast tissue, in and of itself, is a relatively 
common condition. Therefore, this information is not provided to cause 
undue concern; rather, it is to raise your awareness and promote discussion 
with your health care provider regarding the presence of dense breast tissue in 
addition to other risk factors.241 
The Ohio statute requires language that raises awareness of the fact that 
dense breast tissue can obscure cancer and seeks to promote discussion of risk 
factors. The Ohio statute does not direct the patient’s attention to supplemental 
screenings, endorse a vision of shared decision-making, or command 
recipients to ask specific questions of their physicians. However, it does 
explicitly state a goal of promoting discussion. 
In interviews, the advocates have uniformly expressed anger over having 
undergone yearly mammograms and never having been told that they had 
dense breasts which could obscure cancer. The neutral approach and mildly 
directive approaches address the underlying frustration of breast density 
notification advocates without unduly trampling upon women who do not want 
to be proactive participants in their healthcare. In order to truly empower 
women, legislation must allow women to define the terms under which she 
makes healthcare decisions. Legislatively manipulated healthcare decisions are 
just as problematic as physicians making treatment decisions that do not 
reflect the wishes of their female patients. In order to show respect for all 
constituents, legislators should not adopt moderately directive or highly 
directive notification provisions. 
                                                                                                                     
 238 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-43 (Supp. 2015). 
 239 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3702.40(B) (West Supp. 2015). 
 240 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-43(2) (Supp. 2015). 
 241 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3702.40(B) (West Supp. 2015). 
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IV. PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY 
Physicians, researchers, and legislators have long complained that the 
omnipresent fear of a lawsuit forces physicians to practice defensive 
medicine.242 Physicians commonly report ordering extra tests, performing 
unnecessary procedures, and adding additional layers of documentation in 
order to reduce the risk of lawsuit or facilitate a defense if a medical 
malpractice claim is filed.243 Density notification statutes put pressure on 
physicians to order supplemental screenings for women who have dense breast 
in spite of the fact that there is no scientific evidence that such screenings are 
beneficial to most dense women.244 There is little question that the density 
notification language alters the standard of care by nudging physicians to order 
supplemental screenings. 
A. Legislating a Standard of Care 
All of the approaches to density notifications, except for the neutral 
approach which Ohio uses, to varying degrees alert patients to existence of 
supplemental screenings and direct women to ask their physicians about 
them.245 In the face of women asking questions about tests, the number of 
referrals will undoubtedly increase. Therefore, Donna Montalto, executive 
director of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ New 
York chapter, opposes density notification legislation. She believes that the 
legislation will cause OB-GYNs to recommend ultrasounds not because they 
are medically necessary “but mainly because of the threat of malpractice suits 
if breast cancer is missed . . . [t]hat’s defensive medicine.”246 The inherent 
                                                                                                                     
 242 See generally U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE 
AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (July 1994), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/ 
policy/9405.pdf [http://perma.cc/E442-4GPL]. 
 243 See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Beyond Tort Reform: Fixing Real Problems, 3 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 3, 11–12 (2006); see also J. William Thomas et al., Low Costs of 
Defensive Medicine, Small Savings from Tort Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1578, 1578 (2010) 
(noting that “[a] distinction is sometimes made between ‘positive’ defensive medicine—
extra tests or procedures performed primarily to reduce malpractice liability—and 
‘negative’ defensive medicine, by which physicians avoid treating high-risk patients, 
performing high-risk procedures, or practicing in certain geographic areas because of fear 
of potential malpractice litigation”). 
 244 See Sprague et al., supra note 202, at 161–63 (finding that supplemental 
ultrasonography screenings for women with dense breasts has a high false-positive rate and 
substantially increases the number of unnecessary biopsies with little gain in quality-
adjusted life years). 
 245 For a discussion of the various state approaches to density notification, see supra 
Part III.B. 
 246 See Beck, supra note 48; see also Carol H. Lee, Dense Breast Tissue and 
Screening, RADIOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 2014, at 30, http://www.radiologytoday.net/ 
archive/rt0114p30.shtml [http://perma.cc/K38N-HZJP] (“Rather than having a discussion 
and weighing all the different factors, they’re just saying, ‘You have dense tissue; go get an 
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danger with density notification legislations is that it moves the standard of 
care towards practicing defensive (i.e., legislatively prescribed) medicine 
instead of encouraging physicians to utilize evidence based decision-making. 
1. Medical Malpractice 
Medical malpractice is the vehicle through which physicians are held 
accountable for their carelessness to their patients. It is of course an always 
present deterrence to commit errors.247 With nearly 200,000 women being 
diagnosed with breast cancer each year, the failure to diagnose breast cancer is 
the basis for more medical malpractice claims than any other disease in this 
country.248 
To establish medical malpractice or negligence, one must prove a (1) 
preexisting duty owed to the patient, (2) that the duty was breached, (3) that 
the breach of duty caused (4) the patient’s harm.249 The duty is typically 
established by the provider–patient relationship. In most negligence cases 
other than medical malpractice, defendants are judged based on what a 
reasonable person would have done under similar circumstances,250 and 
compliance with custom is a simply one factor for the jury to consider.251 In 
contrast, physicians set their own standard of care, which is based on 
customary practice.252 
Thus, for medical malpractice cases, the customary and usual performance 
of a physician under similar circumstances constitutes the benchmark for 
                                                                                                                     
ultrasound’ or ‘Go get an MRI.’ I don’t think that’s ideal, but I think it’s one of the 
unavoidable consequences of direct density notification.”). 
 247 See CHARLES KRAMER, THE NEGLIGENT DOCTOR 17 (1968); Jennifer Arlen, 
Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of Choice, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 957, 959 (2010) (noting that “[m]alpractice liability is potentially one of the most 
effective mechanisms for reducing medical error”). 
 248 See Gary Hillerich et al., Selecting and Presenting a Failure to Diagnose Breast 
Cancer Case, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 253, 253–54 (1996–97). 
 249 See Bryan A. Liang, Medical Malpractice: Do Physicians Have Knowledge of 
Legal Standards and Assess Cases as Juries Do?, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 59, 59–
60 (1996).  
 250 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“[T]he 
standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a 
reasonable man under like circumstances.”); Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (defining “negligence” as the “failure to exercise the standard of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation”). 
 251 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that 
custom is a factor but not controlling in the determination of whether an actor is negligent). 
 252 See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: 
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 163 (2000) (“While 
defendants in ordinary tort actions are expected to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances, physicians traditionally have needed only to conform to the customs of their 
peers.”). 
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determining whether the physician was negligent or not.253 Thus, the jury’s 
inquiry is positive instead of normative. The jury is charged with determining 
what customary medical practice is and is not charged with determining what 
custom ought to be.254 Clarence Morris, in his widely cited article, Custom and 
Negligence, opined that neither the judge nor the jury is “competent to judge 
whether or not a doctor has acted reasonably.”255 
In medical malpractice cases, physician expert witnesses are critical. The 
plaintiff’s expert or experts must explain what the standard of care is and how 
the defendant deviated from the standard of care. Often the most challenging 
part of the case is establishing a causal connection between the defendant’s 
deviation from the standard of care and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. 
Borgren is illustrative of the challenges that the average plaintiff faces.256 
Margaret Borgren, the plaintiff, was a fifty-two-year-old married mother of 
eight, who had regular biannual screening mammograms.257 Borgren received 
all of her care through Irwin Army Hospital, a veteran’s hospital. Her first 
screening mammogram occurred in June of 1980.258 The report suggested a 
“slight asymmetry” and suggested a six-month follow-up.259 Borgren did not 
follow-up at six months. Her next mammograms occurred in 1983 and 
1985.260 The mammogram reports noted a benign calcification of the left 
breast and no other changes.261 In 1986, Borgren had a fourth mammogram 
after performing a self-examination and finding a lump in her left breast.262 
This time her mammogram was performed at Vail Regional Medical 
Center.263 Her 1986 mammography report noted an architectural distortion in 
the left breast, which lead to her cancer diagnosis.264 
Soon after her 1986 mammogram, Borgren underwent a modified radical 
mastectomy for Stage II infiltrating ductal and lobular carcinoma with sixteen 
of twenty-six nodes positive for tumor.265 Borgren sued the radiologist for 
malpractice arguing loss of chance of survival related to misdiagnosis and 
failure to suggest biopsy after the 1983 and 1985 mammograms.266 Borgren’s 
                                                                                                                     
 253 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the 
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
1382, 1384 (1994). 
 254 See Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 909, 920 (2002). 
 255 Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (1942). 
 256 Borgren v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Kan. 1989). 
 257 Id. at 1380. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id.  
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 262 Borgren, 716 F. Supp. at 1380. 
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expert testified that the malignancy had been present on the 1983, 1985, and 
1986 mammograms and that the delay in diagnosis reduced Borgren’s chance 
of survival by 30-57% over ten years.267 This determination was based on a 
complex formula which included tumor doubling time and nodal status.268 
Further, Borgren’s expert estimated that in 1983 only one to three lymph 
nodes were cancerous.269 The defendant’s expert challenged the standard of 
care that was asserted by Borgren’s expert and suggested that assuming that 
only one to three lymph nodes were cancerous in 1983 was mere 
speculation.270 
The court in Borgren found that the radiologist’s negligence caused: (a) a 
three-year delay in the diagnosis of Borgren’s breast cancer; (b) an increase in 
the number of nodes affected, as only one to three nodes were estimated to be 
affected in 1983 while sixteen to twenty-six were cancerous in 1986; and (c) 
loss of lumpectomy or breast conserving surgery as an option.271 Borgren was 
awarded $800,000 in damages for the decrease chance of survival, pain, 
suffering, mental anguish, and disfigurement.272 The trial court reduced her 
award by 10% for comparative negligence.273 
Borgren, like many breast cancer cases, is premised on a theory of loss-of-
a-chance stemming from a misdiagnosis.274 The causation element in loss-of-
a-chance cases is proven when “the evidence has established the patient had an 
appreciable chance to survive if given proper treatment.”275 Thus, in loss-of-a-
chance cases, the plaintiff does not allege that the physician caused the cancer. 
Instead, the patient argues that the physician’s inaction precluded early 
diagnosis and treatment, which increases the rate of recurrence or shortens the 
patient’s expected life span. 
This type of argument is well-suited in the density notification context. 
The dense woman’s argument would be straightforward. First, she would 
argue that the by virtue of the doctor-patient relationship that the radiologist 
owed her a duty. Second, she would allege that failure to notify or diagnoses 
her dense breasts fell below the standard of care. Third, the patient would 
argue that failure to alert her of her dense breast caused harm because she was 
deprived of the opportunity to undergo supplemental screenings, which would 
have been able to detect the cancer. Finally, she would allege damages. The 
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 268 Borgren, 716 F. Supp. at 1380. 
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 274 See, e.g., Sawlani v. Mills, 830 N.E.2d 932, 935–37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Renzi v. 
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 275 See Borgren, 716 F. Supp. at 1381. 
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most likely damages include shortened lifespan, pain and suffering linked to 
aggressive chemotherapy treatments, lost wages, and emotional distress. 
For radiologists, establishing breast density is not a simple task. While 
some statutes explicitly state the notification should be sent to women with 
“heterogeneously dense” and “extremely dense” breasts as defined by the 
American College of Radiology,276 other states do not provide guidance on 
determining when a woman has sufficiently dense breast to require a 
notification.277 Diagnosing dense breast tissue is not black and white like 
diagnosing high blood pressure or high cholesterol. Sometimes what 
constitutes a dense breast varies widely because the reading is typically 
subjective.278 Most radiologists estimate breast density based on visual 
judgments, but recently, some radiologists have begun using computer 
software to help provide greater consistency across patients.279 
As a result of breast density notification statutes, the standard of care for a 
radiologist is set in part by the legislature. This fact was not completely lost on 
state legislators. Consequently, some states address the scope of civil liability 
in the density notification statue. For example, the Tennessee statute states that 
the notification provisions do not “create a duty of care or other legal 
obligation.”280 Maryland281 and Texas282 also have similar statutory 
provisions. 
The practical effect of such language is unclear. In medical malpractice 
cases, the standard of care is determined by reference to customary practices of 
physicians within the same specialty. One can reasonably assume that it is 
customary for physicians to follow the law. Thus, by requiring physicians to 
disclose notice of breast density, the legislature is setting the standard of care. 
It would be most unusual if medical custom routinely thwarted the law. While 
state legislatures have not explicitly set the standard of care for physicians, the 
law compels physicians to comply and compliance with the law becomes the 
standard of care. 
                                                                                                                     
 276 For example, Alabama, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia clearly require that 
density notifications only be sent to women with heterogeneously dense or extremely dense 
tissue.  
 277 Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Rhode Island requires notifications to 
women with dense breasts without defining the category of density. 
 278 See Lee, supra note 246. 
 279 See Beth W. Orenstein, Breast Density—How Breast Imagers Put Notification  
and Screening into Practice, RADIOLOGY TODAY, Apr. 2014, at 18, 
http://www.radiologytoday.net/archive/rt0414p18.shtml [http://perma.cc/3TF9-PMBZ] 
(noting that the software systems being implemented calculate density differently: Volpara 
uses a volumetric approach to establishing breast density and VuComp uses advanced 
computer vision algorithms to ascertain density).  
 280 TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-245(c) (Supp. 2014). 
 281 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-115(c)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
 282 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 86.013(b) (West Supp. 2014). 
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As a result, the language used by Tennessee and other states is likely not 
enough to prevent plaintiff’s lawyers from using evidence of violating the 
statutes as evidence that the physician breached the standard of care. In the 
minds of the average juror, the standard of care would require physicians to 
comply with the law. In order to ensure that the density notification statute did 
not alter malpractice liability, a state would need to bar evidence of violation 
of the statute. Currently, Texas is the only state that takes this approach. The 
Texas statute provides that “[t]he information required by this section or 
evidence that a person violated this section is not admissible in a civil, judicial, 
or administrative proceeding.”283 By making violation of the statute 
inadmissible, Texas ensures that that the statute will not be used to set the 
standard of care. 
While Texas has effectively addressed liability for physicians, the majority 
of states have not. In the majority of states, density notification expands the 
malpractice risk for physicians, specifically for radiologists, because the 
density notification statutes create a standard of care, and failure to comply 
with the statute creates potential medical malpractice liability. 
2. Medical Negligence Per Se 
Density notification statutes increase the malpractice risk, not just for 
simple negligence based malpractice actions, but also by creating a new risk 
by opening the door to actions based on negligence per se. While medical 
negligence per se cases are rare, density notification statutes in some states 
seem to at least open up the possibility of medical negligence per se actions in 
cases where a patient with dense breasts does not receive a notification. 
Negligence per se is the legal doctrine, which allows courts to use statutes or 
administrative regulations to define the standard of care.284 Generally, 
negligence per se requires that the plaintiff prove the following: (1) violation 
of a statute or regulation;285 (2) the plaintiff is among the class of people for 
                                                                                                                     
 283 Id. § 86.013(c).  
 284 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor 
violates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct 
causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to 
protect.”).  
 285 Most courts do not distinguish between state statutes and local ordinances under the 
theory that both bodies exercise legislative power on behalf of the state. See, e.g., 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Frank Perrotti & Sons, Inc., 566 A.2d 431, 434–35 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 1989); Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 650 S.E.2d 709, 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007) (finding that failure to comply with Fulton County zoning ordinance constituted 
negligence per se); Vega v. E. Courtyard Assocs., 24 P.3d 219, 221–22 (Nev. 2001) 
(holding that violation of a building code provision may serve as the basis for an action 
brought under a negligence per se theory). 
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whose particular benefit the statute or regulation has been enacted;286 (3) 
recognition that a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose 
behind the statute or regulation; and (4) creation of the right would be 
consistent with the overall legislative scheme.287 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that the standard of conduct of 
a reasonable person may be adopted by the court from a legislative enactment 
or administrative regulation which does not so provide, if (a) the purpose is to 
protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff; (b) the purpose of the 
statute was to guard or protect against the particular interest which is invaded; 
(c) the purpose of the statute was to protect the plaintiff from the type of harm 
suffered, and (d) the purpose of the statute was to protect the plaintiff from the 
particular hazard from which the harm results.288 The Restatement goes on to 
state that “[t]he unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an 
administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the 
standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.”289 
In the case of medical malpractice, the primary difference between simple 
negligence and negligence per se is the manner by which liability is 
established. In the normal malpractice case, the plaintiff, through expert 
testimony, must convince a jury or judge that the physician acted negligently 
by deviating from the standard of care. The plaintiff with breast cancer would 
have to prove that the standard of care required the defendant to ascertain that 
she had dense breast and notify her. This is a daunting task. While the 
literature tends to show that juries favor physicians290 and that malpractice 
                                                                                                                     
 286 For example, in Perry v. S.N., the Texas Supreme Court examines five factors when 
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74 (2010) (“Finding that a violation of federal law is negligence per se in a state law case 
allows the federal government to set standards that govern state tort law.”); see also 
Barbara Kritchevsky, Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations of State Laws Enacted Pursuant 
to Federal Mandates Should Not Be Negligence Per Se, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 693, 696 
(arguing that violation of a state law enacted pursuant to a federal mandate should 
generally not give rise to negligence per se liability). 
 288 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 286 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 289 Id. § 288B(1); see also Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (“We 
think the unexcused omission of the statutory signals is more than some evidence of 
negligence. It is negligence in itself.”). 
 290 See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2028 (2006) (finding that 
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plaintiffs have relatively low win rates,291 the subjectivity inherent in 
diagnosing dense breast tissue further tilts the scales in favor of physicians.292 
In medical negligence per se cases, the physician’s negligence is proven by 
showing that the physician violated the applicable statute. The remaining 
issues of proof are limited to showing that the violation of the statute can serve 
as a basis for negligence per se, cause-in-fact, and proximate cause. 
Thus, a breast cancer patient would merely have to prove that the statute 
required that she be given a notification about her dense breast tissue, that the 
required notification was not provided, and that she suffered harm as a result 
of not getting the notification. While not all statutory violations give rise to 
civil liability under a theory of negligence per se, breast cancer plaintiffs can 
make a compelling case that negligence per se is appropriate given the fact that 
the legislature passed the legislation to assure that women would have access 
to supplemental screenings to catch cancer early. 
Some state legislators proactively addressed liability with respect to 
negligence per se when drafting the breast density notification statutes. 
Arizona, California, Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee and Texas 
incorporated language that is designed to limit civil liability that would arise 
from violating the density notification statutes. 
  
                                                                                                                     
physicians won 91% of trials in which the medical care had been deemed proper and 57% 
of cases in which the reviewer found that the physician had erred); Mark I. Taragin et al., 
The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 780 (1992) (reviewing 976 
malpractice cases and finding that physicians won 79% of the cases that had been rated 
defensible insurance investigators and 58% of the cases considered indefensible). 
 291 See Peters, supra note 254, at 932 (“An expanding body of evidence suggests that 
jurors begin their deliberations favoring physician-defendants and doubting the motives of 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases.”).  
 292 See Lee, supra note 246. 
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Table 2: Provisions Designed to Limit Liability 
 Statute does 












to create a 
standard of 



















the statute is 
inadmissible 
in any civil 
proceeding 
Alabama     
Arizona X X   
California X X   
Connecticut     
Delaware   X X 
Hawaii     
Maryland   X  
Massachusetts     
Michigan     
Minnesota     
Missouri     
Nevada  X   
New Jersey     
New York     
N. Carolina     
N. Dakota     
Ohio X X   
Oregon     
Pennsylvania     
Rhode Island     
Tennessee X X   
Texas   X X 
Virginia     
 
Ohio’s statute is illustrative of the typical approach used by states to limit 
civil liability for violating the density notification statute. It explicitly states 
that the density notification requirement does not “[c]reate a new cause of 
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action or substantive legal right against a person, facility, or other entity.”293 It 
further elaborates that the notification law does not “[c]reate a standard of 
care, obligation, or duty for a person, facility, or other entity that would 
provide the basis for a cause of action or substantive legal right, other than the 
duty to send the summary and written report described.”294 Thus, the language 
used in the Ohio statute along with the similar language used in Delaware,295 
Tennessee,296 Nevada,297 Maryland,298 Texas,299 California,300 and 
Arizona,301 effectively forecloses the possibility of plaintiffs bringing a 
medical negligence per se action. The plain meaning of the statutory language 
clearly establishes that these density notification statutes were not intended to 
create a new cause of action. Thus, in Ohio, Tennessee, Nevada, Maryland, 
Texas, California, Delaware, and Arizona, medical negligence per se is not a 
viable vehicle for recovery. However, the fifteen other states do not include 
statutory language that limits civil liability.302 In these states, the state 
legislators have opened the door to new medical negligence per se claims. 
B. Undermining Physicians 
Traditionally, legislatures and the judiciary have shown unparalleled 
deference to physicians. From allowing physicians to set the legal standard of 
care in malpractice cases303 to adopting the corporate of practice of medicine 
doctrine,304 both the legislature and the judiciary have a long history of 
                                                                                                                     
 293 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3702.40(C)(1) (West Supp. 2015).  
 294 See id. § 3702.40(C)(2). 
 295 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3201A (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch. 
193). 
 296 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-245(c) (Supp. 2014). 
 297 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457.1857(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 298 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-115(c)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
 299 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 86.013(b) (West Supp. 2014). 
 300 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123222.3(c) (West Supp. 2015). 
 301 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-415(B) (Supp. 2014). 
 302 Alabama, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia are silent 
with respect to civil liability. 
 303 The Prosser and Keeton hornbook notes that tort law “gives the medical 
profession . . . the privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other groups, of 
setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own practices.” W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189 (5th ed. 
1984) (footnote omitted). 
 304 The corporate practice of medicine doctrine prevents persons or other legal entities 
that are not licensed by the state from providing physician or other medical services or 
from excessively influencing the delivery of such services. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Be 
Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 
HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 243, 249–50 (2004) (explaining that “the corporate practice of 
medicine doctrine prevents persons or entities that are not licensed by the state . . . from 
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treating physicians more favorably than other professional groups.305 
However, the age of deference to physicians has clearly ended. 
The winds started changing in the 1950s and 1960s with judges and 
legislatures forcing doctors to give patients a voice in healthcare decision-
making.306 Recently, the shift away from deference to physicians has been 
dramatic. While the patient autonomy movement forced physicians to share 
information with their patients, the new regulatory trend is to dictate the 
content of patient-physician communications. Density notification statutes are 
one example of this new trend, but there are many. 
The most obvious examples relate to the abortion context. After the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,307 many states enacted informed consent laws.308 
Recently Texas,309 North Carolina,310 and Oklahoma311 enacted bills which 
require physicians to perform ultrasounds and explain the images by providing 
“the dimensions of the embryo or fetus and the presence of external members 
and internal organs” before performing an abortion.312 These statutes were 
swiftly challenged in courts by physicians with mixed results.313 
In another example of legislators influencing physician-patient 
communication, Florida implemented legislation that bans physicians from 
talking with their patients about gun ownership as part of a preventive care 
                                                                                                                     
providing physician or other medical services or from excessively influencing the delivery 
of those services”). 
 305 Physicians have historically enjoyed immunity from anti-trust laws. See, e.g., James 
F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and 
State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1486 (1994) 
(discussing that “the judicially-created ‘state action’ doctrine in the antitrust context allows 
states to substitute their own regulations for the regime of competition envisioned by 
antitrust law”). 
 306 See discussion of patient autonomy and the doctrine of informed consent supra Part 
III. 
 307 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 308 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3(4)(A) (2012); IDAHO CODE § 18-609(5) (Supp. 
2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(b) (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(h) 
(West Supp. 2014). 
 309 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 2014). 
 310 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2), (4) (2013). 
 311 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B)(2), (4) (Supp. 2015). 
 312 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85(a)(4) (2013). 
 313 The North Carolina statute, the Woman’s Right to Know Act, was held 
unconstitutional by Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014), finding that 
forcing physicians to say things they otherwise would not say violated the First 
Amendment rights of physicians. In Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28, 28–29 
(Okla. 2012) (per curiam), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the speech and 
display requirements were unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent. In contrast, 
the Texas statute was deemed constitutional and upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
584 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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discussion.314 The Florida law was a response to the American Academy of 
Pediatrics recommending that pediatricians counsel parents about the dangers 
of allowing children and adolescents to have access to guns inside and outside 
of the home.315 Similarly, in 2012, California became the first state in the 
nation to prohibit licensed psychotherapists from engaging in sexual 
orientation change efforts, such as conversion therapy, for patients under 
eighteen years of age.316 In 2013, New Jersey passed a similar statute.317 The 
California statute was challenged by a host of interested parties including 
mental health providers who offered conversion therapy. Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals employed rational basis review and held that the 
statute was rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting 
minors and was not facially void for vagueness or overbroad.318 
With respect to end-of-life communications, California319 and New 
York320 passed legislation mandating that physicians offer to provide 
information and patient counseling regarding palliative care and end-of-life 
options to terminally ill patients. The bills were met with opposition by some 
physicians who argued that the laws impermissibly intrude into the doctor–
patient relationship and fail to appreciate the nuances involved in diagnosing a 
person as terminally ill.321 
Finally, in Pennsylvania, state legislators enacted Act 13, which prevents 
physicians from disclosing information about chemicals used in the fracking 
process to patients.322 Two cases brought by physicians challenging the Act 
                                                                                                                     
 314 Florida’s Firearm Owners Privacy Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338 (West Supp. 
2015), was challenged by physicians and physician advocacy groups on First and 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Although the plaintiffs won at the trial court level, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the law. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 
1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that Florida’s Firearm Owners Privacy Act does not 
facially violate the First Amendment).  
 315 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS COUNCIL ON INJURY, VIOLENCE, & POISON PREVENTION 
EXEC. COMM., Policy Statement: Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric 
Population, 130 PEDIATRICS e1416, e1421 (2012), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/ 
content/early/2012/10/15/peds.2012-2481.full.pdf [http://perma.cc/DAF4-WCPC]. 
 316 Sexual orientation change efforts include “efforts to change behaviors or gender 
expressions, or to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward 
individuals of the same sex.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865(b)(1) (West Supp. 2015). 
 317 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West Supp. 2015). 
 318 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 319 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West Supp. 2015). 
 320 Palliative Care Information Act, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (West 
 2015). 
 321 See, e.g., Alan B. Astrow & Beth Popp, The Palliative Care Information Act in 
Real Life, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1886 (2011); Jane E. Brody, Law on End-of-Life 
Care Rankles Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/06/07/health/07brody.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/3MTE-DYCH]. 
 322 See 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1(b)(11) (West Supp. 2015):  
If a health professional determines that a medical emergency exists and the 
specific identity and amount of any chemicals claimed to be a trade secret or 
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were dismissed for lack of standing.323 Collectively, these statutes represent a 
dangerous trend. This Article does not purport to provide an analysis of the 
constitutionality of dense breast tissue notification requirements and other 
attempts to influence the content of patient-physician communications.324 
Since Casey affirmed the state’s authority to regulate the content of physician–
patient communications under the state’s licensing authority, this Article 
assumes that dense breast tissue notification laws are constitutional.325 
However, even though the constitutionality of the density notification 
provisions cannot seriously be doubted, dense breast tissue notification laws 
and similar legislation still merit serious reconsideration. The overarching 
policy question is should state legislators dictate patient-physician 
communications? The answer is generally no. Legislation that directs 
physicians to communicate state-mandated messages creates rigid 
proclamations in a vacuum, which are particularly ill-suited to a field like 
medicine where small nuances can change the standard of care. When 
physicians are not communicating their independent expertise and judgment 
but instead are conveying messages proscribed by the state, the physician–
patient relationship is undermined. Americans have long held, albeit at times 
irrational, fears of government intrusion in healthcare decision-making, and 
                                                                                                                     
confidential proprietary information are necessary for emergency treatment, the 
vendor, service provider or operator shall immediately disclose the information to the 
health professional upon a verbal acknowledgment by the health professional that the 
information may not be used for purposes other than the health needs asserted and that 
the health professional shall maintain the information as confidential. 
 323 See Rodriguez v. Abruzzo, 29 F. Supp. 3d 480, 486 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Rodriguez v. 
Krancer, 984 F. Supp. 2d 356, 364 (M.D. Pa. 2013). 
 324 A number of scholars have thoroughly analyzed the constitutionally of state 
regulation of physician speech. See, e.g., Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of 
Doctor–Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. 
REV. 201, 202, 266 (1994) (arguing that compelled speech that is viewpoint neutral is 
protected, whereas partisan messages about particular treatments or options are 
unconstitutional); Clay Calvert et al., Physicians, Firearms & Free Expression: 
Reconciling First Amendment Theory with Doctrinal Analysis Regarding the Right to Pose 
Questions to Patients, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 62 (2013) (arguing that Florida’s 
Firearm Owner’s Privacy Act is an unconstitutional content-based speech regulation); 
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 989–90 (arguing that the First Amendment is 
not violated by compelled speech mandates as long as physicians retain the right to 
disagree with or undermine messages that the state wishes to communicate); see also 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (2014) 
(arguing that it is mandatory abortion counseling laws and not cigarette warnings or crisis 
pregnancy center disclosures that offend free speech principles). 
 325 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1192) (“To be sure, the 
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the state.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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these statutes suggest that such fears are warranted.326 Banning or mandating 
physician speech is counterproductive and interferes with healthcare decision-
making. 
In the context of density notification statutes, the legislation is particularly 
troubling because it is not supported by scientific evidence. As previously 
discussed, there is nothing objectionable about requiring physicians to give 
women accurate information about the risk of having dense breasts. However, 
suggesting follow-up supplemental screenings is very troubling. The American 
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists does not recommend using 
additional screening tests for women with dense breasts unless multiple other 
risk factors are present.327 Further, the American College of Radiology urges 
caution “in considering a statutory or legislative mandate to include 
breast . . . density information in the patient summary.”328 
The medical community does not broadly embrace routine supplemental 
screenings because there is insufficient data to support their widespread use. 
Only a few studies have analyzed the effectiveness of supplemental screenings 
and most have focused on ultrasounds. Recent research from the University of 
Connecticut School of Medicine at Farmington showed that the state’s dense 
breast law has resulted in more cancer detection, but noted that the false-
positive rate and number of biopsies had also increased.329 The average cost of 
each new cancer found was $110,000.330 Another study found that using 
supplemental ultrasound added 1.7 quality adjusted life years at a cost of 
$325,000 per year gained.331 
Given the lack of controlled reliable data, it is hasty for legislatures to 
direct women to inquire about supplemental screenings especially because, 
through that direction, they are creating a climate where physicians feel 
pressure to order the screenings.332 A look back at previous treatment fads 
                                                                                                                     
 326 Sarah Palin famously expressed this fear when she posted a diatribe entitled 
“Statement on the Current Health Care Debate” on her Facebook page. In relevant part she 
writes, “The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or my baby with 
Down Syndrome will have to stand in front of Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats 
can decide, based on a subjective judgment . . . whether they are worthy of health care. 
Such a system is downright evil.” Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care 
Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7, 2009, 1:26 PM), https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id 
=113851103434 [https://perma.cc/RSP2-KFCW]. 
 327 See Roni Caryn Rabin, Dense Breasts May Obscure Mammogram Results, N.Y. 
TIMES: WELL (June 16, 2014, 4:54 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/dense-
breasts-may-obscure-mammogram-results/ [http://perma.cc/B8M2-VQUW]. 
 328 See ACR, Reporting Breast Density, supra note 141. 
 329 See Kathryn L. Greenberg et al., Ultrasound Screening in Women with 
Mammographically Dense Breasts, RADIOLOGICAL SOC’Y N. AM. (Nov. 27, 2011), 
http://archive.rsna.org/2011/11007957.html [http://perma.cc/N49H-2BCG]. 
 330 Id. 
 331 See Sprague et al., supra note 202, at 154. The costs decreased to $246,000 per 
QALY gained when only screening women with extremely dense breasts. Id. 
 332 Connecticut and Rhode Island specifically name ultrasounds and MRIs as 
supplemental screenings that should be discussed with physicians.  
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suggest that caution is needed. In the 1990s, 41,000 women decided to forgo 
standard chemotherapy in favor of undergoing high-dose chemotherapy with 
autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC-ABMT).333 At over $100,000, the 
procedure was extremely costly.334 It was also extremely risky335 with myriad 
side effects.336 Many insurers deemed the procedure to be experimental and 
refused to cover it. So, women sought governmental intervention to assure 
affordable access. When studies were eventually published that definitively 
demonstrated the procedure was ineffective, more than 30,000 women had 
received the treatment, which increased their suffering and shortened their 
lives at a cost of roughly $3 billion.337 
In some respects, history can be said to be repeating itself. In addition to 
efficacy of screenings, recently, mammograms themselves have been sullied. 
In a study of nearly 90,000 women lasting a quarter of century, researchers 
found that the death rates from breast cancer were the same in women who 
received mammograms and those who did not.338 The study also concluded 
that one in five cancers found with mammography were treated unnecessarily 
with chemotherapy, surgery, or radiation.339 At the same time, screening 
technologies and recommendations are not static; they are constantly in a state 
of flux.340 The law charges physicians with the duty of staying abreast of new 
data, technology, and drugs so that they can adequately apprise patients of 
their options. When physicians fail to live up to that duty, they can be sued for 
malpractice. Legislators do not share in that duty to patients. Legislators 
legislate and then move on to the next issue, leaving physicians to administer 
                                                                                                                     
 333 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 33, at 101.  
 334 See Patricia C. Kuszler, Financing Clinical Research and Experimental Therapies: 
Payment Due, but from Whom? 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 441, 458 (2000). 
 335 See Geoffrey Cowley et al., In Pursuit of a Terrible Killer, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 
1990, at 66, 68 (stating that 5–10% of breast cancer recipients die from complications of 
treatment). 
 336 See JoAnne Zujewski et al., Much Ado About Not . . . Enough Data: High-Dose 
Chemotherapy with Autologous Stem Cell Rescue for Breast Cancer, 90 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 200, 203 (1998). 
 337 See Thomas H. Maugh II, Studies Refute Marrow Procedure for Breast Cancer, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/11/news/mn-7674 
[http://perma.cc/FK9J-LQMR]. 
 338 Anthony B. Miller et al., Twenty Five Year Follow-up for Breast Cancer Incidence 
and Mortality of the Canadian National Breast Screening Study: Randomised Screening 
Trial, 348 BRITISH MED. J. g366, g366 (2014).  
 339 Id. 
 340 For example, the United States Preventative Service Task Force reversed their 
position on breast self-examination in 2009. The newest recommendations do not 
recommend breast self-examinations and suggest that women should start screening 
mammograms at fifty instead of forty. See Gina Kolata, New Guidelines Suggest Cutback 
in Mammograms, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2009), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9C0DE3DD1338F934A25752C1A96F9C8B63 [http://perma.cc/GL6Y-
G9ZW]. See Beck, supra note 109, for a discussion of new screening technologies. 
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an unyielding mandated disclosure and navigate any legal pitfalls that the 
disclosure may create. 
Thus, mandating physician communication prevents the communication 
from being able to adapt to the fluidity of medical breakthroughs. Without the 
ability to adapt communication, physicians are hamstrung and must waste time 
talking about issues, which may not be relevant. To the extent they want to 
know, women should receive unbiased and current information on breast 
cancer risk and screening options from the best source. The best source is 
clearly their physician and not state legislators. The inflexible nature of 
mandates makes them particularly ill-suited for the context of physician–
patient communication. As a result, state and federal legislators should avoid 
enacting legislation that controls the content of physician–patient 
communication. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR AUTONOMY 
Lawmakers cannot fix every ill, nor should they try. The breast density 
notification advocates represent a sliver of constituents. These advocates want 
more information largely because they have the education to understand and 
digest the disclosures. They also have the resources to act upon what they 
learn from their physicians. For the less educated, the disclosure can be 
unhelpful and confusing.341 For the less affluent, being directed to discuss 
supplemental screenings that you cannot afford (and that may not be covered 
by insurance) with your physician can cause anxiety and stress.342 When 
legislating, it is incumbent upon legislatures to conceive of how the problem 
they are trying to address affects their constituents as a whole. With respect to 
breast density, legislation should be aimed at improving care for all women. 
A. Public Health Recommendation 
American women cite breast cancer as their number one personal health 
fear, notwithstanding the fact that other causes of death claim more women’s 
lives each year.343 To put breast cancer risk in context, heart disease is the 
number one killer of American women. It kills roughly 267,000 women a year, 
                                                                                                                     
 341 See, e.g., Mark V. Williams et al., Inadequate Functional Health Literacy Among 
Patients at Two Public Hospitals, 274 JAMA 1677, 1677 (1995) (finding that four of ten 
patients could not “comprehend directions for taking medication on an empty stomach” 
and nearly six of ten could not understand the standard informed consent document). 
 342 See Elisabeth Jacobs, The Politics of Economic Insecurity 10 (Issues in Governance 
Studies No. 10, Sept. 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/ 
2007/9/politics-jacobs/jacobs20070913.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z9DA-P37D]. 
 343 See Women’s Fear of Heart Disease Has Almost Doubled in Three Years, but 
Breast Cancer Remains Most Feared Disease, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/educational/hearttruth/about/fear-doubled.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
5YCX-J2AQ] (last updated Feb. 29, 2012) (reporting that 22.1% of women selected breast 
cancer and 9.7% selected heart disease). 
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while breast cancer kills about 40,000.344 Even among cancers, breast cancer 
ranks second behind lung cancer which kills about 90,000 women each 
year.345 
The stature that breast cancer has in the minds of women is in part due to 
tremendous physical and emotional toll required to fight the disease.346 
However, the stature of breast cancer is also driven by the robust network of 
organizations dedicated to breast cancer, which have successfully increased 
awareness of the disease and flooded women with the message that 
mammograms save lives.347 
Despite the fact that almost every woman is aware of breast cancer, there 
are a host of studies that have examined women’s actual understanding of 
breast cancer including risks,348 screenings,349 and treatment options.350 
Generally, these studies have found that women benefit from the use of well-
crafted decision-aids, but also that women have widespread misconceptions 
                                                                                                                     
 344 See Heart Disease Statistics at a Glance, GO RED FOR WOMEN, 
https://www.goredforwomen.org/about-heart-disease/facts_about_heart_disease_in_women-
sub-category/statistics-at-a-glance/ [https://perma.cc/B2K5-FRAT] (noting that while one 
in thirty-one American women dies from breast cancer each year, one in three dies of heart 
diseases, and only one in five American women believe that heart disease is her greatest 
health threat). 
 345 See Lung Cancer Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/lung/statistics/ [http://perma.cc/UZS3-FRJ3] (last updated Aug. 
20, 2015) (noting that in 2012, 99,433 women were diagnosed with lung cancer and 70,734 
died from lung cancer). 
 346 See Nurik, supra note 5 (noting that she had a double mastectomy with 
reconstructive surgery and then began chemotherapy, and the side-effects of chemotherapy 
included “intense fatigue, mouth sores, joint and nerve pain, bloody noses and an extensive 
list of physical maladies that were simply painful and exhausting[, and it] brought on 
instantaneous menopause”). 
 347 See Orenstein, supra note 23 (“[M]ammography remains an unquestioned pillar of 
the pink-ribbon awareness movement. Just about everywhere I go—[from] the super 
market . . . [to] the airport . . . I see posters proclaiming that ‘early detection is the best 
protection’ . . . .”). 
 348 See generally, e.g., Larissa Nekhlyudov & Ann Partridge, Breast Cancer Risk 
Communication: Challenges and Future Research Directions: Workshop Report (United 
States), 14 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 235 (2003). 
 349 See, e.g., Gianfranco Domenighetti et al., Women’s Perception of the Benefits of 
Mammography Screening: Population-Based Survey in Four Countries, 32 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 816, 817 (2003); David A. Haggstrom & Marilyn M. Schapira, Black–
White Differences in Risk Perceptions of Breast Cancer Survival and Screening 
Mammography Benefit, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 371, 373 (2006). 
 350 See, e.g., Collins et al., supra note 192, at 519; Angela Fagerlin et al., An Informed 
Decision? Breast Cancer Patients and Their Knowledge About Treatment, 64 PATIENT 
EDUC. & COUNSELING 303, 303 (2006) (finding that “[o]nly 16% of women knew that 
recurrence rates were different for mastectomy and BCS, and 48% knew that the survival 
rates were equivalent across treatment”); Katherine A. O’Leary et al., Information 
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about breast cancer. One study found that over two-thirds of women believe 
that mammograms prevent or reduce the risk of contracting breast cancer and 
that 62% of women believe that screening at least halves breast cancer 
mortality.351 Another study found that 76% of women overestimated 
mammography screening benefits and 63% underestimated their chances of 
living five years or longer after a cancer diagnosis.352 
These studies suggest that women would broadly benefit from having 
better access to information about breast cancer. After a woman has undergone 
a mammogram and been diagnosed with dense breasts is not the best time to 
explain the risks associated with dense breasts. At this juncture, her ability to 
process the information is compromised by worry and anxiety. Thus, giving a 
woman information about breast density for the first time in a mammographic 
report is a particularly poor way to advance the goals of promoting 
autonomous decision-making and improving patient care. Campaigns about 
breast cancer need to evolve from bringing awareness to conveying actual 
knowledge. 
Public health models typically utilize websites and public service 
announcements to convey information to the public.353 These campaigns are 
typically appealing because they promote individual autonomy by allowing 
people to use the information as they see fit to do so.354 Assuming that the 
information disseminated is current and unbiased, a public health model is a 
better tool for facilitating autonomy. Broad-based education campaigns 
provide a baseline level of knowledge that a woman can draw from, if she so 
chooses, when she visits her physician. The role that a woman chooses to have 
in medical decisions is hers alone to make. Supporting and funding a public 
health campaign provides information without directing how the information 
is used. Thus, it is fully compatible with notions of autonomy. In addition, 
public health advertisements and websites are relatively easy to change to 
reflect current research. In contrast, the density notification laws are fixed and 
amendments are subject to what is usually a drawn out legislative process. 
The drawbacks to public health campaigns are that conveying complex 
information is a difficult task. Data and statistics are hard to convey because 
people interpret chance terms very differently.355 For example, in one study 
that looked at how patients interpret probability statements researchers found 
that “[o]nly 80.3% [of research participants] agreed that certain meant 100 of 
100 people and only 67.8% agreed that never meant zero of 100 people.”356 
                                                                                                                     
 351 See Domenighetti et al., supra note 349, at 816. 
 352 See Haggstrom & Schapira, supra note 349, at 373. 
 353 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 337–38 (Lawrence O. 
Gostin ed., 1st ed. 2002). 
 354 Id.  
 355 See Tim Smits & Vera Hoorens, How Probable is Probably? It Depends on Whom 
You’re Talking About, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 83, 84 (2005). 
 356 Kimberley Koons Woloshin et al., Patients’ Interpretation of Qualitative 
Probability Statements, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 961, 965 (1994). 
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Further, over forty million adults are functionally illiterate and an additional 
fifty million have marginal literacy skills.357 Thus, there is a chance even well-
designed campaigns will fail because a large swath of the population will still 
be unable to absorb the information presented. 
Ultimately, even if a public health campaign fails to successfully reach all 
women, it still has the benefit of protecting the sanctity of physician–patient 
communication. There is a tremendous benefit in having physicians 
communicate freely and confidentially with their patients without worrying 
about what message the state is requiring them to convey. The proper role of 
the physician is to focus on the patient and not on state-mandated messaging. 
Thus, state-sponsored health initiatives allow the state to convey its message 
while allowing doctors to speak independently. 
B. Legislative Recommendations 
Dense breast tissue notification laws have noble goals. Namely, they 
aspire to give women access to information about their breast density so that 
they can make an informed choice about their healthcare screening options. 
While this goal is laudable, the path that many legislators have taken to 
achieve this goal is concerning. Many states have enacted legislation that 
informs and directs women to act.358 In essence, the ability of women to make 
an autonomous choice is now being thwarted by the state rather than 
physicians. Directing and guiding a woman’s healthcare choice does not 
comport with the patient autonomy movement. For legislators who sincerely 
believe that legislative action is needed, there are steps that can be taken to 
ensure that notification statutes inform rather than direct women. 
First, legislators should avoid drafting a notification statement that 
explicitly or implicitly promotes a certain outcome. This means that 
notification statutes should not direct dense women to “use” the information to 
talk to her physician359 nor should the statute state that the woman may use the 
information to engage in shared decision-making with her physician.360 Dense 
women should be free to decide whether they want to bring up breast density 
with their physician or not. It is perfectly reasonable for a woman to rely 
exclusively on her physician’s judgment. 
In the breast cancer context, legislation passed under the guise of 
empowering women has oftentimes undermined women by directing women 
                                                                                                                     
 357 Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Sci. Affairs, Am. Med. 
Ass’n, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, 281 JAMA 552, 552 
(1999). 
 358 See supra Part III.B for a discussion of highly directive and moderately directive 
approaches to density notification laws. 
 359 See supra Part III.B.1 for an example of highly directive notification statutes. 
 360 See supra Part III.B.2 for an example of moderately directive notification statutes. 
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towards the preferred choice.361 Whether to discuss breast density with a 
physician and whether to have supplemental screenings are each choices that 
should be made by women. Thus, secondly, legislators should avoid referring 
to, or worse still, specifically naming, supplemental screening tests such as 
ultrasounds or MRIs. Mentioning supplemental screenings suggests that a 
supplementary screening is or may be necessary. This is quasi-medical advice 
that is out of sync with the current recommendations of the American 
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American College of 
Radiology.362 
Statements which verge on giving medical advice are inappropriate 
because most legislators lack the training to provide medical advice. In 
addition, these statements foster a culture of defensive medicine. When 
patients ask physicians for testing based on information contained in a state-
mandated density disclosure, physicians will undoubtedly feel some 
compulsion to order the supplemental screening tests regardless of whether 
there is a sufficient scientific basis to warrant utilization. A quarter of state 
legislators lack college degrees, thus the average legislator is not qualified to 
give medical advice.363 As a result, deferring to the recommendations of 
respected medical bodies like the American Congress of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists is the appropriate course of action. When drafting density 
notification language, the language should convey that dense breast tissue may 
obscure abnormalities on a mammogram in language that is easy to understand 
without opining about whether supplementary tests are necessary. 
Consequently, it is also premature for states to require insurance coverage 
of supplemental screenings for dense women. As long as the medical 
community maintains that such widespread screenings are medically 
unnecessary, it makes little sense for states to force insurers to require such 
tests. Supplemental ultrasounds cost hundreds of dollars, while MRIs cost over 
a thousand dollars. Researchers have put the costs of defensive medicine at 
over forty billion dollars per year and mandating insurance coverage for 
supplemental tests will only push this figure higher.364 Thus, legislators should 
not mandate insurance coverage for supplemental screenings unless a majority 
of the medical community supports its routine use. 
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Third, it is incumbent upon legislators to ensure that the density 
notification statutes do not increase the number of medical malpractice cases 
against physicians. Consequently, legislators should make their intentions 
clear with respect to civil liability. Dense breast tissue notification statutes 
should explicitly state that it does not create a new cause of action or a 
standard of care and that violation of the statute is inadmissible in any civil 
proceeding. Clearly stating this makes it abundantly clear to the plaintiff’s bar 
that violation of the statute will not give rise to liability under a theory of 
negligence per se.365 
Finally, the nature of the legislative process is such that constituents 
typically lobby to have legislation enacted because they have been harmed by 
lack of regulation. Once legislation is passed, forces are such that it is rare that 
a group will lobby to have the legislation repealed. The nature of medical 
innovation is such that it is changing rapidly. So, even a simple notification 
that dense breast tissue may obscure cancer on a mammogram may be 
outdated in a couple of years. To combat the speed of medical advances, dense 
breast tissue notification statutes should have sunset provisions366 which force 
legislators to revisit the language after a few years. A few years after 
implementation, legislators will be able to access how the mandate is affecting 
women and physicians. In addition, they will be able to ascertain whether the 
description of breast density risks still accurately reflects current medical 
knowledge. In sum, a sunset provision acts a check to ensure that the 
mandated risk information does not become outdated and forces legislators to 
confront whether continued legislation is warranted. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For women who are diagnosed with breast cancer, there is no question that 
times have changed for the better. The collective sense of isolation among 
breast cancer survivors has been replaced by a robust community of survivors, 
thrivers, and inspirers. The community of survivors is active. Survivors have 
been incredibly effective at channeling their resources to advocate for more 
research, more choices, and better patient–physician communication. Yet, 
motivated by urgency and the gravitas of their foe (breast cancer), their 
advocacy is often impetuous and incautious. While dense breast tissue can 
obscure cancer on mammograms, the quick remedy of sending women a letter 
and directing them to discuss breast density with their physicians and ask 
questions about supplemental testing is ill considered. 
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Women are not a monolithic group. Early breast cancer advocates 
mobilized and fought for women to have a voice that was acknowledged, 
recognized, and respected. The new generation of breast cancer advocates 
must remember that women are different and that one-size-fits-all problem 
solving is rarely effective. For legislators considering breast density 
notification legislation, caution should be exercised. The harm that needs to be 
remedied should be conceived broadly. Women, generally, lack an 
understanding about breast cancer risks and the ability of mammograms to 
detect cancer. While the simplicity of mandates is alluring due to their ease, 
such mandates are a poor solution to the pervasive lack of understanding about 
the disease itself. 
Hastily enacted density notification statutes can have numerous 
unintended consequences such as eroding trust between physicians and 
patients and undermining patient autonomy. The laudable goal of empowering 
women to make informed healthcare decisions is better achieved through 
population based public health initiatives rather than targeting individual 
interactions with physicians. Physicians are bound by professional ethics to 
use their specialized skills to serve and work for the best interests of their 
patients. Legislatures should allow physicians to do their jobs without undue 
interference. 
While women can benefit from neutral and truthful information about 
breast cancer, methods of detection, and breast density, most states have 
utilized breast density notification statutes to direct and usher women towards 
questioning their physicians and demanding supplemental cancer screenings. 
States choosing to enact density legislation should draft neutral notification 
language, which simply informs women of their density and the limitations of 
mammography. 
